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Notes 
PROTECTING THE PLAYGROUNDS OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  ANALYZING 
COMPUTER AND INTERNET RESTRICTIONS 
FOR INTERNET SEX OFFENDERS 
[T]he skyrocketing on-line presence of children, the proliferation of child 
pornography on the Internet, and the presence of sexual predators trolling for 
unsupervised contact with children, has resulted in a chilling mix which has 
resulted in far too many terrible tragedies that steal the innocence from our 
children and create scars for life.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A fourteen year old female just logged on to the computer as 
SchoolGirl14 to talk to some friends.2  Although her parents trust her 
judgment and want to give her a taste of freedom, they have responsibly 
installed monitoring software that will keep her out of restricted web 
sites.  Bigboy44 sits hundreds of miles away in his living room typing on 
his laptop.  Bigboy44 engages in a conversation with SchoolGirl14.  He 
tells SchoolGirl14 that he just moved to the area and is looking to meet 
people.  SchoolGirl14 responds by asking who he is and how he got her 
name.  Bigboy44 strategically avoids the question and asks if she would 
like to see a picture of him.  Not knowing any better and letting her 
curiosity take over, SchoolGirl14 agrees and clicks on the “accept picture” 
dialogue box that appears on her screen.  Displayed on her screen is an 
indecent picture of Bigboy44.  Bigboy44 then asks SchoolGirl14 if she has 
any pictures like the one he just sent her.  SchoolGirl14 tells Bigboy44 she 
has to eat supper and later reports the incident to her parents.  
Concerned, her parents report the incident to police, and Bigboy44 
becomes the target of an investigation. 
                                                 
1 144 CONG. REC. H4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum).  But 
see Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators as Contaminating Forces:  The Language of 
Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 554 (2002).  Lynch argues that under the Child Protection and 
Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998, the Internet is not an information super highway; 
rather, the Internet is a dead end for sexual predators.  Id. at 553.  Lynch states that the Act 
serves two important purposes:  (1) it protects our children, and (2) it punishes child 
predators.  Id. 
2 This hypothetical is completely fictional and entirely the creation of the author.  Any 
resemblance to real persons or facts is coincidental. 
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One week later, SchoolGirl14 logs on and receives a message from 
Bigboy44, but this time SchoolGirl14 is an undercover agent.  After two 
weeks of soliciting SchoolGirl14, Bigboy44 asks to meet her to have sexual 
intercourse.  SchoolGirl14 agrees, and the undercover agent initiates a 
sting operation.  Bigboy44 is then apprehended, prosecuted, and serves 
time in jail. 
At BigBoy44’s supervised release hearing, the prosecuting attorney 
and supervising officer recommend that BigBoy44 be prohibited from 
possessing and using a computer and accessing the Internet during the 
period of his supervised release unless otherwise approved by the officer 
or the court.3  Ultimately, however, although post-release supervision 
restrictions are generally left to the court’s discretion, the judge’s 
decision is nevertheless largely influenced by the laws in the jurisdiction 
in which he sits.  Therefore, depending on the jurisdiction in which this 
case is considered, the judge may choose not to restrict BigBoy44’s 
computer or Internet use, to restrict BigBoy44’s computer but not Internet 
use, to restrict only BigBoy44’s Internet use and not his computer use, or 
to restrict BigBoy44’s computer and Internet use. 
Federal statutes have not specifically addressed post-release 
supervision restrictions for Internet sex offenders and although some 
states have enacted statutes governing these restrictions, differing 
standards have emerged in these statutes, resulting in varying 
approaches to post-conviction release hearings for Internet sex 
offenders.4  This Note will analyze these varying approaches and 
propose a model statutory scheme for states, but it first briefly discusses 
the role of computers and the Internet in today’s society. 
The Internet can significantly increase one’s ability to find, manage, 
and share information.  As a result, today, a large number of Americans 
have access to the Internet.  In October 2003, the United States 
Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and 
                                                 
3 Supervised release is the period of time when an offender, serving a determinate 
sentence, is supervised in the community following release from the prison portion of the 
offender’s sentence.  U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/library/glossary.html#S (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2009). 
4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 947.1405(7)(a)(7), 948.30(1)(g)–(h) (2007) (requiring that an 
Internet sex offender complete a treatment program before being allowed to regain 
computer or Internet access); MINN. STAT. § 243.055 (2003) (detailing Minnesota’s computer 
restrictions for sex offenders who are determined to be at high risk for using the Internet to 
commit criminal acts); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1)(q) (2006) (prohibiting sex offenders 
from Internet access); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (restricting access 
to the Internet for certain Internet sex offenders).  Currently, no federal statute specifically 
addresses computer and Internet restrictions for Internet sex offenders.  See generally 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583 (2000) (setting forth the guidelines and conditions of sentencing, but 
not specifically addressing the use of computers or Internet).  
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Information Administration (“NTIA”) released its sixth report examining 
the use of computers and the Internet.5  The NTIA’s report stated that 
approximately sixty-two percent of United States households reported 
owning a computer, and of that sixty-two percent, almost eighty-eight 
percent of these homes had access to the Internet.6  Never before have 
instruments so powerful as computers (and the Internet) been available 
to the public at affordable costs, but this power comes at a price.7  
Indeed, in 2006, nearly half of all children in the United States under the 
age of eighteen used the Internet,8 and one in seven of these children 
received a sexual solicitation involving the request to engage in sexual 
talk or other sexual activity, or to provide personal sexual information.9  
                                                 
5 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE:  ENTERING THE BROADBAND AGE 
(September 2004), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04. 
pdf. 
6 Id. at 5.  This means that almost 113 million households in America had Internet 
access, a number that has risen almost four percent since the Department of Commerce’s 
2002 report.  Id.  See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE:  HOW 
AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET 1 (February 2002), 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf (providing statistics and data 
obtained during the 2001 survey of American households).  This report provides statistical 
data and information on the spread of computer and Internet usage across the nation.  Id.  
Use of the computer and Internet by Americans has grown substantially.  Id.  Children and 
teenagers use the computer and Internet more than any other age group.  Id.  The use of the 
Internet is increasing, irrespective of income, age, gender, ethnicity, and education.  Id. 
7 Steve Martinez, The Internet, Part 1, http://www.archdiosa.org/to_protect/victims/ 
TheInternetPart1.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).  In a six-part series, Mr. Martinez, Director 
of the Office of Victim Assistance and Safe Environment for The Archdiocese of San 
Antonio, discusses the findings of a report issued on September 1, 2006, by the Texas 
Council of Sex Offender Treatment.  Id. 
8 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, Punishment of Internet Predators 
Varies Greatly by State, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/ 
NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_ US&PageId=2947.  The National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children is a nonprofit organization that works in cooperation with 
the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention.  Id.  Since its establishment in 1984, the United States Department of Justice has 
assisted with more than 125,500 missing child cases, resulting in the recovery of more than 
107,600 children.  Id. 
9 Id.  See also DAVID FINKEHOR ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER, 
ONLINE VICTIMIZATION:  A REPORT ON THE NATION’S YOUTH ix (2000).  This survey 
suggested that many youth (approximately one in five) received a sexual solicitation over 
the Internet in the last year; one in thirty-three received an aggressive sexual solicitation; 
one in four had unwanted exposure to pictures of naked people or people having sex in the 
last year; and one in seventeen was threatened or harassed and encountered a substantial 
quantity of offensive episodes.  Id.  The Crimes Against Children Research Center 
(“CACRC”) report defined sexual solicitations and approaches as “[r]equests to engage in 
sexual activities or sexual talk or give personal sexual information that were unwanted or, 
whether wanted or not, made by an adult.”  Id. at x (emphasis omitted).  Aggressive sexual 
solicitation involves “offline contact with the perpetrator through regular mail, by 
telephone, or in person or attempts or requests for offline contact.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
Blaisdell: Protecting the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First Century: Analyzing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1158 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
Given the rise of computer and Internet use in all facets of our lives, it is 
not surprising that using computers and the Internet to perpetrate 
criminal activity has become increasingly common.10 
To address the issue of escalating Internet and Internet-related 
crimes, when imposing post-release supervision restrictions for Internet 
sex offenders, some courts have restricted offenders’ use of the Internet, 
and some have even gone so far as to restrict offenders’ possession or use 
of a personal computer.11  Federal appellate courts have disagreed, 
though, regarding whether computer and Internet use, post-release, 
supervision restrictions should be imposed for Internet sex offenders 
and, if they should be imposed, what types of restrictions are 
appropriate.12  To be sure, computer and Internet restrictions began as a 
means of protecting the public, but because technology is constantly 
evolving, the legal analysis applied by courts in determining computer 
and Internet restrictions must also evolve.13  Before proposing a model 
approach for imposing these types of restrictions on Internet sex 
                                                                                                             
Last, unwanted exposure to sexual material was defined as “[w]ithout seeking or expecting 
sexual material, being exposed to pictures of naked people or people having sex when 
doing online searches, surfing the web, [or] opening E-mail or E-mail links.”  Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
10 DANE C. MILLER ET AL., CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION THAT LIMIT AN OFFENDER’S 
ACCESS TO COMPUTERS AND INTERNET SERVICES:  RECENT CASES AND EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY, CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 3, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July–August 2006); see BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 399 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a computer crime as a crime that involves the 
use of a computer). 
11 Compare United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 
1002 (2002) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 
condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from having, possessing, or 
having access to computers, the Internet, photographic equipment, audio/video 
equipment, or any item capable of producing a visual image), with United States v. Holm, 
326 F.3d 872, 878–79 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 894 (2003) (holding that a condition 
of defendant’s supervised release, to the extent that the condition was intended to be a total 
ban on the Internet use, swept more broadly and imposed a greater deprivation on the 
defendant’s liberty than was necessary).  See also Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity of 
Condition of Probation, Supervised Release, or Parole Restricting Computer Use or Internet Access, 
4 A.L.R. 6th 1, 19, 23–25 (2005). 
12 See infra Part II.C (discussing the federal circuit spilt).  Unlike the Courts of Appeals 
for the, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, , and D.C. Circuits, which have upheld restrictions on Internet 
and computer use, the Second and Seventh Circuits have invalidated these restrictions.  Id.  
Notably, the Third and Tenth Circuits fall in the middle of the spectrum; that is, they have 
both upheld and invalidated computer and Internet use restrictions, depending on the 
circumstances.  Id. 
13 MILLER ET AL., supra note 10, at *4.  Miller cites to People v. Rocco, 309 A.D.2d 882 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2003), in which the court noted that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
conduct business in contemporary society without the use of or access to a computer.  Id.  
In addition, as new technology develops, there becomes a stronger link between television, 
telephones, and computers through Internet connections.  Id. 
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offenders, Part II of this Note discusses how courts have determined 
whether computer and Internet use, post-release, supervision restrictions 
for Internet sex offenders are appropriate.14  Part III then discusses 
arguments in favor of and against implementing these restrictions and 
also assesses the judicial reasoning and policy considerations in support 
of these restrictions.15  Finally, Part IV introduces a model statute for 
states to enact that appropriately addresses post-release supervision 
restrictions for Internet sex offenders.16  This Note now considers how 
the current inconsistent approach to post-release supervision restrictions 
for Internet sex offenders surfaced. 
II.  LEGAL HISTORY OF REGULATING SEX OFFENDERS 
This Part explores the history of sex offender statutes and case law.  
Specifically, Part II.A examines how federal sex offender statutes have 
evolved as society has become increasingly concerned with punishing 
sex offenders.17  Next, Part II.B discusses the establishment and goals of 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”) in 
addition to terms of supervised release.18  Part II.C then considers the 
inconsistencies among the circuit courts with regard to post-release 
supervision restrictions for Internet and non-Internet sex offenders.19  
Finally, Part II.D examines how the rights of privacy of Internet sex 
offenders have become increasingly restricted.20 
A. Congressional Actions Against Sex Offenders 
1. Progression of Sex Offender Statutes—From Jacob Wetterling to 
Adam Walsh 
In 1989, Jacob Wetterling (“Wetterling”), an eleven year old boy, was 
abducted from Minnesota and has yet to be found.21  Wetterling’s mother 
                                                 
14 See infra Part II (discussing the history of Internet sex offender laws and relevant case 
law). 
15 See infra Part III (analyzing the effectiveness of computer and Internet restrictions 
imposed on Internet sex offenders). 
16 See infra Part IV (proposing a model statute for states to adopt). 
17 See infra Part II.A (discussing legislation Congress has passed to regulate sex 
offenders). 
18 See infra Part II.B (discussing the sentencing guidelines that courts may consider when 
sentencing Internet sex offenders). 
19 See infra Part II.C (identifying inconsistencies in cases decided by federal courts). 
20 See infra Part II.D (discussing the limited expectations of privacy of both criminal and 
Internet sex offenders). 
21 Susan Oakes, Comment, Megan’s Law:  Analysis on Whether it is Constitutional to Notify 
the Public of Sex Offenders Via the Internet, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1133, 
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became an advocate for missing children after her son’s abduction and, 
in 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (“Wetterling Act”).22  
This statute compelled states to require persons convicted of sexual 
crimes against children or sexually violent crimes to register with the 
government upon release from prison or placement on parole.23  The 
statute applied to individuals convicted of sexual battery, kidnapping of 
a child, production or distribution of child pornography, and sexual 
conduct with a minor.24 
Two years after Congress passed the Wetterling Act it enacted 
Megan’s Law which made two significant changes to the privacy rights 
of registered sex offenders.25  First, Megan’s Law required private 
registry data to become public information, and second, it required state 
and local law enforcement agencies to release relevant sex offender 
information necessary to protect the public.26  The mandatory disclosure 
                                                                                                             
1133–34 (1999).  Wetterling and two other young boys were riding their bikes when a 
masked man jumped out and surprised them.  Id. at 1133 n.2.  The masked man told the 
boys to throw their bikes in the ditch and lay face down on the ground.  Id.  The man then 
dismissed the other two boys but took Wetterling; neither the man nor Wetterling were 
ever found.  Id.  See also Keith S. Hampton, Children in the War on Crime:  Texas Sex Offender 
Mania and the Outcasts of Reform, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 781 (2001) (reviewing sex offender laws 
in the historical context of high-profile child abductions and murders). 
22 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (Supp. 2004).  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14071.  The Act requires 
states to implement a system whereby all persons who commit sexual or kidnapping 
crimes against children, or who commit sexually violent crimes against any person 
(whether adult or child), are required to register their addresses with the State upon their 
release from prison.  Id.  The 1994 Act also provides that law enforcement agencies may 
release relevant information about a sex offender if they deem it necessary to protect the 
public.  Id.; see also Oakes, supra note 21, at 1138 (stating that the Jacob Wetterling Act 
encouraged states to establish a system in which any person who commits a sexual or 
kidnapping offense against a child is required to register his or her address with the state in 
which he or she resides upon release). 
23 139 CONG. REC. H10320 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).  See also Christina Locke & Dr. Bill F. 
Chamberlin, Safe From Sex Offenders?  Legislating Internet Publication of Sex Offender 
Registries, 39 URB. LAW. 1, 3 (Winter, 2007). 
24 Locke & Chamberlin, supra note 23, at 3.  Shortly after passing the Wetterling Act, 
Congress imposed a two-year deadline on states to create a registry or else face a ten 
percent cut in federal funding for state law enforcement.  Id.  By 1996, all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia had complied with the Act.  Id. 
25 Id. at 4.  Unaware and uninformed, Megan Kanka (“Megan”) and her parents lived 
across the street from a sex offender in their New Jersey home.  Id. at 1.  At the age of seven, 
Megan was raped and murdered by the neighboring sex offender, who had twice before 
been convicted of sex crimes against children.  Id.  After her death, Megan’s parents lobbied 
the federal government to make sex offender information available to the public.  Id. at 2. 
26 Final Guidelines for Megan’s Law and the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,009 (July 21, 1997).  See 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/6
2009] Computer and Internet Restrictions for Sex Offenders 1161 
amendment applied to offenders committing both sex offenses against 
minors and sexually violent offenses.27  In 1997, the United States House 
of Representatives discussed possible improvements that could be made 
to the original Wetterling Act.28  Although the bill passed the House by a 
vote of 415 to 2, it was not passed into law as written.29   
2. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
On July 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (“Walsh Act”) for nationalized 
sex offender registration.30  The constitutional validity of the Walsh Act 
                                                                                                             
Locke & Chamberlin, supra note 23, at 4.  One element Megan’s Law failed to include was 
how the sex offender registry information would be relayed to the public.  Id. 
27 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,009 (July 21, 1997).  See Locke & Chamberlin, supra note 23, at 4.  
There were several other laws that amended the Wetterling Act.  Id. at 4.  See generally Pam 
Lyncher Act, Pub. L. No. 104-236, § 2, 110 Stat. 3093 (1996). First, the Pam Lyncher Act, 
passed in 1996, directed the FBI to compile a national database of registered sex offenders 
and gave the FBI discretion to release relevant information from the registry to the public.  
Id.  See also generally PROTECT, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).  Then, in 2003, the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(“PROTECT”) Act was passed, strengthening law enforcement’s powers in preventing and 
investigating sex crimes against children and prosecuting and punishing the sex offenders 
responsible for committing these crimes.  Id.; Locke & Chamberlin, supra note 23, at 4.   
28 Lynch, supra note 1, at 542.  The purpose of this legislation was to strengthen the 1994 
Wetterling Act by requiring federally convicted sex offenders to register in the state where 
they reside.  Id.  In addition, the legislation would have mandated offenders to register in 
multiple states if they commuted for work or school.  Id. 
29 See id.  However, H.R. 3494, proposing the Child Protection and Sexual Predator 
Punishment Act of 1998, was enacted into law in October 1998.  Id. at n.17.  The Act would 
increase federal punishment for persons engaged in child sex offenses and would also 
criminalize a range of Internet communications.  Id.  See generally Child Protection and 
Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998, 144 CONG. REC. H4491-505 (1998); Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration 
Improvements Act of 1997, 144 CONG. REC. H7626-31 (1997). 
30 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (2006).  The purpose of the Adam Walsh Act was to provide a more comprehensive, 
nationalized system for registration of sex offenders.  Id.  States are required to conform to 
the various aspects of sex offender registration including the information that must be 
collected.  Id.  The Act mandates sex offender registration as follows: 
(b) Initial registration 
The sex offender shall initially register— 
 (1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to 
the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or 
 (2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that 
offense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
42 U.S.C. § 16913(b) (2000).  A key element of the Adam Walsh Act is that it establishes 
standards to promote greater uniformity across public sex offender websites—standards 
that the Wetterling Act had left to the discretion of individual states.  Adam Walsh Act, 120 
Stat. 587. 
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has been challenged in courts on the grounds that the Act violates the 
non-delegation doctrine, fails to provide a hearing or petition process, 
and applies to crimes that were committed prior to its enactment.31  In 
United States v. Madera, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed a Florida district court’s retroactive application of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”); however, the 
Madera court did not rule on the constitutionality issues raised by the Act 
and decided by the district court.32 
                                                 
31 See infra note 32 (discussing the facts of the Florida district court case).  Compare 
United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d 846 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that the Sex Offender 
and Registration Act “SORNA” did not apply retroactively and that SORNA violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution), with United States v. Templeton, 
No. 06-291, 2007 WL 445481 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2007) (finding that SORNA covered 
individuals convicted before July 27, 2006, and finding no violation of the Ex Post Facto, 
Due Process, or Commerce Clauses), and United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1257 
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (finding no violation of the non-delegation doctrine, applying the law 
retroactively, finding no violation of the Ex Post Facto, Due Process, or Commerce 
Clauses), rev’d 528 F.3d 852, 858–59 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the District Court did not 
have the authority to apply SORNA retroactively; therefore, the defendant was not in 
violation of the registration requirements).  See also United States v. Markel, No. 06-20004, 
2007 WL 1100416 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 11, 2007) (unpublished) (following the holdings in 
Madera and Templeton); United States v. Manning, No. 06-20055, 2007 WL 624037 (W.D. 
Ark. Feb. 23, 2007) (same).  See generally United States v. Muzio, No. 4:07CR179 CDP, 2007 
WL 2159462 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2007) (holding that SORNA did not apply to the defendant 
based on a plain reading of the language, but nevertheless holding that the Act was 
constitutional). 
32 Madera, 528 F.3d at 858–59, rev’g 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1257.  The government indicted 
Wilfredo G. Madera, a convicted sex offender, for failure to register under SORNA 
guidelines.  Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.  Madera moved to have the action dismissed, 
arguing that the registration requirements under SORNA were unconstitutional.  Id. at 
1260.  First, Madera argued that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated to the Attorney 
General the power to retroactively apply the Act.  Id.  Second, Madera’s complaint alleged 
that the Act would punish him for crimes that were committed prior to the Act’s 
enactment, violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id. at 1262.  Third, Madera argued that the 
Act violates both substantive and procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment 
because it fails to provide for a hearing or petition process prior to the publication of the 
defendant’s name on the sex offender registry or prior to the defendant being compelled to 
comply with the reporting conditions.  Id. at 1264.  Last, Madera contested the statute’s 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 1265.  The district court held that 
SORNA does not violate any of the following:  (1) the non-delegation doctrine of Article I, 
§ 1 of the United States Constitution per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); (2) 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, pursuant to the logic in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), which 
addressed the Alaska Sex Offender Registry requirements; (3) procedural due process 
under the Fifth Amendment pursuant to Conn. Dep’t of Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); (4) 
substantive due process, pursuant to decisions in various circuits, such as Doe v. Moore, 410 
F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005), Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004), and Gunderson v. 
Hyass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003); and (5) the Commerce Clause, pursuant to Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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Title I of the Walsh Act created SORNA.33  The law established 
guidelines for state registries and mandated a nationwide sex offender 
registry along with tougher penalties for sex offenders who failed to 
register.34  In addition to the National Guidelines, section 146(c) of 
SORNA established the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (“SMART”).35  The SMART 
office is responsible for determining whether jurisdictions have met all of 
the requirements of SORNA.36 
SORNA governs all fifty states, the District of Columbia, the five 
principal United States territories, and the federally recognized Indian 
tribes that elect to function as registration jurisdictions.37  SORNA 
requires the registration of every sex offender who engages in a sexual 
act with another by force or threat of serious violence, a sexual act with 
another by rendering unconscious or drugging the victim, or a sexual act 
                                                 
33 Adam Walsh Act, 120 Stat. 587.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, FACT SHEET:  THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
AND NOTIFICATION ACT (SORNA) 1 (May 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/sorna_factsheet.pdf.  SORNA establishes 
minimum registration and notification standards for sex offenders.  Id. 
34 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210 (May 30, 2007).  The Federal Register sets forth the national 
guidelines for states to establish sex offender registration and notification programs.  Id.  
These National Guidelines comply with section 112(b) of SORNA, which requires the 
Attorney General to issue guidelines to interpret and implement SORNA.  Id.  According to 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Fact Sheet, the guidelines provide all guidance and advice 
regarding the administration and implementation of SORNA’s standards.  Fact Sheet, supra 
note 33, at 4.  At the Presidential signing of SORNA, President Bush noted that SORNA 
“will greatly expand the National Sex Offender Registry by integrating the information in 
state sex offender registry systems and ensure that law enforcement has access to the same 
information across the United States.”  PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, Statement upon 
Signing H.R. 4472 (July 27, 2006), as reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. S35, S36. 
35 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210.  The purpose of SMART is to partner with state organizations as a 
resource in the federal government to help further the states’ sex offender registration and 
notification programs.  Id.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION 1, 10 
(Proposed Guidelines, May 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/ 
proposed _sornaguidelines.pdf. 
36 See Guidelines, supra note 35, at 10.  The final day for jurisdictions to meet the 
minimum requirements of SORNA is July 27, 2009.  Id. 
37 Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at 4.  See Guidelines, supra note 35, at 12.  Although the 
governed jurisdictions are as described in the text, they are not limited to carrying out their 
functions through their own political subdivisions.  Id.  See also Nora V. Demleitner, First 
Peoples, First Principles:  The Sentencing Commission’s Obligation to Reject False Images of 
Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 574 (2002).  Demleitner discusses the typical Native 
American sex offender and the impact of the Sentencing Guidelines on this unique type of 
offender.  Id. at 576.  Additionally, Demleitner argues that Native Americans do not fit the 
stereotypical sexual predator model and are not high-risk sex offenders.  Id.  Demleitner 
concludes by suggesting that the sentencing Commission addressed the uniqueness of 
Native Americans and sentencing regulations.  Id. at 587. 
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with a child under the age of twelve.38  Along with requiring sex 
offenders to register, SORNA also sets forth three tiers of sex offenders 
into which all sex offenders may be classified.39  To comply with 
                                                 
38 See Guidelines, supra note 35, at 17 (presenting the comparison of a jurisdiction’s laws 
to those federal laws mentioned above).  “‘Sexual act’ for this purpose should be 
understood to include any of the following:  (i) oral-genital or oral-anal contact, (ii) any 
degree of genital or anal penetration, and (iii) direct genital touching of a child under the 
age of 16.”  Id.  See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(2)(a) (2007).  In Louisiana, it is 
theoretically possible for a defendant to receive the death penalty for aggravated rape of a 
minor under the age of thirteen.  Id.  But see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child that 
was not intended to result in death). 
39 Guidelines, supra note 35, at 16.  42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2000) reads as follows: 
In this title the following definitions apply: 
 (1) Sex offender.  The term “sex offender” means an individual 
who was convicted of a sex offense. 
 (2) Tier I sex offender.  The term “tier I sex offender” means a sex 
offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender. 
 (3) Tier II sex offender.  The term “tier II sex offender” means a 
sex offender other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and—   
  (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following 
offenses, when committed against a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy 
to commit such an offense against a minor: 
   (i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of title 
18, United States Code [18 USCS § 1591]); 
   (ii) coercion and enticement (as described in section 
2422(b) of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS § 2422(b)]); 
   (iii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal 
sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a)[] of title 18, United 
States Code [18 USCS § 2423(a)][)]; 
   (iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 
of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS § 2244]); 
  (B) involves— 
   (i) use of a minor in a sexual performance; 
   (ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or 
   (iii) production or distribution of child pornography; or 
  (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender. 
 (4) Tier III sex offender.  The term “tier III sex offender” means a 
sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more 
than 1 year and— 
  (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following 
offenses, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense: 
   (i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as 
described in sections 2241 and 2242 of title 18, United States Code [18 
USCS §§ 2241 and 2242]); or 
   (ii) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 
of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS § 2244]) against a minor who 
has not attained the age of 13 years; 
  (B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a 
parent or guardian); or 
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SORNA, a state does not have to label offenders as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier 
                                                                                                             
  (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier II sex offender. 
 (5) Amie Zyla expansion of sex offense definition. 
(A) Generally.  Except as limited by subparagraph (B) or (C), 
the term “sex offense” means— 
   (i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a 
sexual act or sexual contact with another; 
   (ii) a criminal offense that is a specified offense against 
a minor; 
   (iii) a Federal offense (including an offense prosecuted 
under section 1152 or 1153 of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS 
§ 1152 or 1153]) under section 1591 [18 USCS § 1591], or chapter 109A 
[18 USCS §§ 2241 et seq.], 110 [18 USCS §§ 2251 et seq.] (other than 
section 2257, 2257A, or 2258 [18 USCS § 2257, 227A, or 2258]), or 117 
[18 USCS §§ 2421 et seq.], of title 18, United States Code; 
   (iv) a military offense specified by the Secretary of 
Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 
951 note); or 
   (v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense 
described in clauses (i) through (iv). 
 . . . . 
 (6) Criminal offense.  The term “criminal offense” means a State, 
local, tribal, foreign, or military offense (to the extent specified by the 
Secretary of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-
119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note)) or other criminal offense. 
 (7) Expansion of definition of “specified offense against a minor” 
to include all offenses by child predators.  The term “specified offense 
against a minor” means an offense against a minor that involves any of 
the following: 
  (A) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) 
involving kidnapping. 
  (B) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) 
involving false imprisonment. 
  (C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct. 
  (D) Use in a sexual performance. 
  (E) Solicitation to practice prostitution. 
  (F) Video voyeurism as described in section 1801 of title 18, 
United States Code [18 USCS § 1801]. 
  (G)  Possession, production, or distribution of child 
pornography. 
 . . . . 
Id.  Guidelines, supra note 35, at 16.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 16911.  First, Tier I sex offenders are 
those offenders who do not fit into either level II or III.  Id. § 16911(2).  Tier II sex offenders 
typically target minors and engage in violent crimes such as sex trafficking, coercion and 
enticement, transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and abusive 
sexual contact.  Id. § 16911(3).  In addition, Tier II classifications include the use of a minor 
in a sexual performance, solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, or production or 
distribution of child pornography.  Id.  Tier III sex offenders have committed the following 
crimes:  aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact with a minor who 
has not attained the age of thirteen years, or kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a 
parent or guardian).  Id. § 16911(4). 
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III sex offenders, per se, but it must show that its current classification 
system follows the same substantive principles that SORNA uses to 
classify offenders.40  In addition, SORNA addresses several technical 
details of the sex offender registration process, such as the type of 
information sex offenders are required to disclose and how this 
information is disseminated to the public; instructions that advise sex 
offenders to what location they must report in order to begin the initial 
registration process and to keep their registration information current; 
requirements that indicate how frequently sex offenders must meet with 
the registration office to update their personal information; and 
information indicating how all of the sex registration requirements are 
enforced.41   
In conclusion, the overall purpose of SORNA is to protect the public 
by requiring sex offenders who have been released from incarceration to 
report certain information and by also requiring states to collect and 
disseminate this information to the public.42  SORNA’s success depends 
on effective interstate arrangements for tracking sex offenders as they 
move from one state to another.  Of course, states are required under 
SORNA to implement some sort of registration system; in addition, in an 
                                                 
40 See Guidelines, supra note 35, at 24.  The Guidelines establish that a jurisdiction does 
not have to use the same terminology that SORNA has created so long as the classification 
system used is commensurate with the minimum standards set out in 42 U.S.C. § 16911.  Id.  
Those sex offenders satisfying the criteria for each SORNA tier are subject to durations of 
registration, appearance frequency, and website disclosure requirements.  Id.  See also Safe 
NOW Act of 2006, H.R. 4815, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).  Safe NOW Act of 2006 is a bill 
that proposes the establishment of a National Sex Offender Risk Classification Task Force 
whose duty would be to create a risk-based sex offender classification system that would 
be used nationwide to identify sex offenders and create a uniform national classification 
system.  Id.  The bill never went to vote before the end of the congressional session.  Id. 
41 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210-211.  See Ryland Devero, Bill would add Internet details to Sex 
Offender Registry, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, September 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2007/09/01/bill-would-add-Internet-
details-sex-offender-regis/.  “A Missouri state representative has proposed legislation that 
would require sex offenders to register e-mail addresses and electronic identities, such as 
instant messaging screen names, with state law enforcement.”  Id.  Only those e-mail 
addresses and electronic identities registered will be allowed to be used, and use of a 
nonregistered ID will be treated the same as not registering an address.  Id.  See also Steven 
J. Wernick, Note, In Accordance With a Public Outcry:  Zoning Out Sex Offenders Through 
Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147 (2006).  Expanding the registration laws 
to keep track of sex offenders, some states are resorting to even more restrictive measures 
by implementing residence restrictions, such as prohibiting sex offenders from living near 
schools and other child-centered facilities.  Id. 
42 Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration, 72 Fed. Reg. at 30,210–11.  Ultimately, 
SORNA replaced the piecemeal, repeatedly-amended Jacob Wetterling Act of 1994.  Id.  See 
The National Conference of State Legislatures Summary for Public Law 109-248 (HR 4472), 
http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/walshact.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) 
(providing a comprehensive summary of the Walsh Act). 
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effort to further protect the public, some states have attempted to do 
more than what SORNA requires:  some states have enacted their own 
sentencing guidelines and post-release supervision restrictions for 
Internet sex offenders.43  Not only have sex offenders challenged the 
constitutionality of SORNA and the federal Sentencing Guidelines, but 
they have also challenged corresponding state sentencing guidelines and 
post-release supervision restrictions for Internet sex offenders. 
B. Sentencing Guidelines and Terms of Supervised Release 
1. United States Federal Sentencing Statutes 
Former United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated that 
“the ability of judges to exercise discretion ‘threatens the progress we 
have made in ensuring tough and fair sentences for federal offenders.’”44  
The Sentencing Guidelines provide the framework under which the 
judiciary imposes all sentencing in the federal criminal system.45  Over 
the past few years, Congress has passed many federal laws enhancing 
                                                 
43 42 U.S.C. § 16912 (current through P.L. 110-316 approved 8-14-08) (requiring states to 
comply with SORNA requirements).  See Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 30,210.  The SMART Office is also responsible for determining whether a 
jurisdiction has substantially implemented the SORNA requirements.  Id. 
44 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER, NACDL Report, Truth in Sentencing? The Gonzales 
Cases, 17 No. 5, 327–34 (July 2005).  Gonzales illustrated the varying types of judicial 
discretion by giving the following real life example.  Id.  Two defendants, one from New 
York and one from New Jersey, were convicted of similar charges involving the possession 
of child pornography.  Id. at 327.  The New York defendant faced sentencing of twenty-
seven to thirty-three months in prison, but received only probation, whereas the New 
Jersey defendant faced sentencing of thirty to thirty-seven months and received forty-one 
months in prison.  Id.  Gonzales stated that the difference between the two sentences was 
based upon what each judge deemed important.  Id.  The New York judge reasoned that 
the defendant would best benefit from psychological treatment and only sentenced him to 
probation.  Id.  On the other hand, in New Jersey, the judge felt that protection of the public 
was most important and best accomplished by sentencing the offender to prison.  Id.  Some 
commentators argue that judicial discretion can protect society better than mandatory 
sentencing guidelines, but the discrepancy in sentencing is troublesome.  Id.  
45 Christopher Wiest, Comment and Casenote, The Netsurfing Split:  Restrictions Imposed 
on Internet and Computer Usage By Those Convicted of a Crime Involving a Computer, 72 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 847, 848–49 (2003).  The Sentencing Guidelines determine the length of a prison 
sentence, while also allowing a judge to impose a term of supervised release after 
incarceration.  Id. at 849.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000) (providing factors that courts look to 
when determining the appropriate sentence to impose on a defendant).  See also Frank E. 
Correll, Jr., Note, You Fall into Scylla in Seeking to Avoid Charybdis:  The Second Circuit’s 
Pragmatic Approach to Supervised Release for Sex Offenders, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 686–
89 (2007) (discussing which factors courts look to in determining appropriate conditions of 
supervised release and how those factors are tied to the provisions presented in § 3553). 
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the sentencing penalties for sex offenders and increasing the supervision 
of sex offenders who are released from prison.46 
In 1984, Congress established the United States Sentencing 
Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) through the passage of the 
Sentencing Reform Act.47  The Sentencing Commission is responsible for 
helping to create more equitable sentencing policies for delinquent 
members of society.48  Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission 
                                                 
46 Demleitner, supra note 37, at 564.  Many federal laws that have been passed by 
Congress and aimed at enhancing the penalties for sex offenders have been driven by 
public concern about sex offenders and the media’s active role in publicizing sexual crimes 
across the country.  Id.; see supra Part II.A.1 (discussing numerous statutes that have helped 
shape sex offender registration and sentencing guidelines). 
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000), which established the Sentencing Commission and set out 
its purpose: 
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are 
to— 
 (1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal 
criminal justice system that— 
  (A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set 
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; 
  (B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes 
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of 
general sentencing practices; and 
  (C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice 
process; and 
 (2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the 
sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting 
the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, 
United States Code. 
Id.  The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act alluded to the principal goal of 
supervised release.  See also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 124 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307.  The 1983 Senate Judiciary Committee reported that 
the sentencing purposes of incapacitation and punishment would not 
be served by a term of supervised release—that the primary goal of 
such a term is to ease the defendant’s transition into the community 
after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, 
or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short 
period in prison . . . but still needs supervision and training programs 
after release. 
Id. 
48 See Demleitner, supra note 37, at 566.  Demleitner notes that in order for the 
Commission to create effective sentences for each type of individual, it must develop 
guidelines that consider the backgrounds and characteristics of typical offenders of the 
crime at issue rather than base the guidelines on an unrepresentative stereotypical 
offender.  Id.  This becomes even more difficult when dealing with sex offenders, in 
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enacted two distinct, yet intertwined, statutes of Title 18 of the United 
States Code—section 3553, Imposition of a Sentence, and section 3583, 
Inclusion of a Term of Supervised Release.49  The Sentencing 
Commission not only creates statutes that determine the length of the 
sentence that a convicted criminal may face, it also allows a court to 
impose a term of supervised release to follow any prison sentence.50  The 
restrictions, however, must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than 
is reasonably necessary to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct, protect the public from future potential crimes of the defendant, 
and provide the defendant with the needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner.51 
                                                                                                             
particular, because of the diverse nature of this type of offender.  Id.  Thus, the following 
question arises:  whether federal judges should impose individualized sentences or take a 
more nationally uniform approach.  Id.  
49 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583 (2000).  Section 3553(a) of the Code sets forth general 
factors to be considered when imposing a sentence for any criminal offender.  Id. § 3553(a).  
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court determined that the Sentencing Guidelines are 
advisory rather than mandatory.  543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).  Booker arose in the context of 
sentencing enhancements, not supervised releases, and the Court’s opinion narrowly 
reflects this.  Id. at 244–45.  See also United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732–33 (8th Cir. 
2005).  Decided after Booker, the Crume court determined that a court may impose only 
those special conditions of supervised release that satisfy three statutory requirements: 
First, the special conditions must be ‘reasonably related’ to five 
matters:  the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s 
history and characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the 
protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the 
defendant’s educational, vocational, medical or other correctional 
needs.  Second, the conditions must ‘involve[] no greater deprivation 
of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to advance deterrence, the 
protection of the public from future crimes of the defendant, and the 
defendant’s correctional needs.  Finally, the conditions must be 
consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the 
sentencing commission. 
Id. at 733 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
50 See Wiest, supra note 45, at 849 (discussing the role of Section 3583 within the scope of 
the Sentencing Guidelines and the court’s discretion in implementing those guidelines).  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583, which states: 
(a) In general.—The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of 
imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of 
the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of 
supervised release after imprisonment, except that the court shall 
include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be 
placed on a term of supervised release if such a term is required by 
statute or if the defendant has been convicted for the first time of a 
domestic violence crime as defined in section 3561(b) [18 USCS 
§ 3561(b)]. 
Id. 
51 18 U.S.C. § 3583; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). 
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Prohibitions on computer and Internet use for convicted Internet sex 
offenders on supervised release vary in form and degree.52  Special 
restrictions imposed and upheld by courts cover a broad range of 
exclusions.53  At one end of the spectrum is a complete prohibition on 
computer and Internet use.54  At the other end of the spectrum, circuit 
courts of appeals have required district courts to establish standards that 
are narrowly tailored to target specific unwanted Internet access, 
ultimately concluding that broad computer and Internet use restrictions 
are too invasive.55  Finally, there is a middle-ground approach by which 
courts have implemented computer and Internet restrictions but have 
also required these restrictions to contain exceptions to allow computer 
or Internet use when it is approved in advance by the released sex 
offender’s probation officer.56  Although some circuit courts have created 
restrictions, the discretionary approach of these federal courts has caused 
states to take individual action and create their own statutory language. 
2. State Statutory Sentencing Guidelines—Action in a Time of Inaction 
While federal lawmakers merely debated and reviewed possible 
statutes and regulations regarding Internet crimes and Internet sex 
offenders, states like Minnesota and New Jersey took action.57  In United 
                                                 
52 See Wiest, supra note 45, at 861.  The variety and disparity in prohibitions and 
sentencing is in part due to the fact that there is no precise language for the courts to follow 
in their discretionary sentencing.  Id.; see infra Part II.C (discussing the split among Federal 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and the various factors that each considers when choosing to 
uphold or deny a computer or Internet restriction). 
53 See Wiest, supra note 45, at 861 (identifying the various approaches and addressing 
several questions raised by the implementation of those approaches). 
54 Id.; see infra Part II.C.1 (discussing circuit cases that have upheld a complete ban on 
computer and Internet use). 
55 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing circuit cases that disallow a complete ban on computer 
and Internet use). 
56 See Wiest, supra note 45, at 861.  See also ARTHUR L. BOWKER & GREGORY B. THOMPSON, 
COMPUTER CRIME IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PROBATION OFFICER, 65 
Federal Probation 18 (Sept. 2001) (suggesting that as the criminal’s modus operandi 
changes, so must the probation officer’s approach to monitoring the criminal).  This article 
notes that the type of probation officer recruited and the type of training a probation officer 
receives once hired has changed in the Twenty-First Century, compared to previous 
centuries.  Id. 
57 See FLA. STAT. §§ 947.1405(7)(a)(7), 948.30(1)(g)–(h) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 243.055 
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1)(q) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 
2008).  See also Brown v. Cockrell, No. 3-02-CV-2433-N, 2003 WL 21458751, *1 (N.D. Tex. 
Apr. 29, 2003).  The Cockrell court held that the state’s imposition of a condition that 
prohibited the defendant from owning or operating a computer or photographic 
equipment without prior approval did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id. at *5.  The 
defendant was convicted of sexual assault with a child and indecency with a child.  Id. at 
*1.  After the defendant had already been sentenced and was serving his mandatory 
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States v. Beckman, a Minnesota court rejected Bradley Beckman’s 
contention that Minnesota’s statutory provision prohibiting the use of 
the Internet while on probation was not reasonably related to the 
purposes of sentencing and that the restriction inflicted a greater 
deprivation on his liberty than was reasonably necessary.58  Minnesota 
Statute Section 243.055(1) provides that the state can “prohibit the 
individual from possessing or using a computer with access to an 
Internet service or online service without the prior written approval of 
the [C]ommissioner[.]”59  Prior to Beckman, when there was no Minnesota 
                                                                                                             
supervised release, the State Department of Criminal Justice, pursuant to a newly enacted 
state statute, added ten new special conditions to his probation restrictions, including one 
that prohibited computer use.  Id. at *4. 
58 United States v. Beckman, No. CX-02-2248; 2003 WL 22774394, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 25, 2003).  Bradley Beckman was charged with possessing pornographic material of a 
minor on his computer zip drives and was sentenced to one year and one day of jail time, 
followed by three years of probation in which he was not allowed access to the Internet.  Id. 
at *1.  See Miller, supra note 11, at 22–23 (citing courts allowing complete bans on 
defendants’ Internet access as long as the bans are pre-approved by a probation officer). 
59 MINN. STAT. § 243.055(1) (2003).  Minnesota’s statute reads as follows: 
Subdivision 1.  Restrictions to use of online services.  If the 
commissioner believes a significant risk exists that a parolee, state-
supervised probationer, or individual on supervised release may use 
an Internet service or online service to engage in criminal activity or to 
associate with individuals who are likely to encourage the individual 
to engage in criminal activity, the commissioner may impose one or 
more of the following conditions: 
 (1) prohibit the individual from possessing or using a computer 
with access to an Internet service or online service without the prior 
written approval of the commissioner; 
 . . .  
 (3) require the individual to consent to periodic unannounced 
examinations of the individual's computer equipment by a parole or 
probation agent, including the retrieval and copying of all data from 
the computer and any internal or external peripherals and removal of 
such equipment to conduct a more thorough inspection; 
 (4) require consent of the individual to have installed on the 
individual’s computer, at the individual’s expense, one or more 
hardware or software systems to monitor computer use; and 
 (5) any other restrictions the commissioner deems necessary. 
Subd. 2.  Restrictions on computer use.  If the commissioner believes a 
significant risk exists that a parolee, . . . may use a computer to engage 
in criminal activity or to associate with individuals who are likely to 
encourage the individual to engage in criminal activity, the 
commissioner may impose one or more of the following restrictions: 
 (1) prohibit the individual from accessing through a computer 
any material, information, or data that relates to the activity involved 
in the offense for which the individual is on probation, parole, or 
supervised release; 
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case law on point as to whether a state could deprive a defendant of use 
of the Internet, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that a state 
could restrict the use the of Internet.60 
In the New Jersey Senate, Assemblyman Richard J. Codey 
introduced Bill Number 1979 on June 12, 2006.61  This bill allowed for 
certain restrictions on the computer and Internet privileges of sex 
offenders.62  In addition, the bill required convicted sex offenders to 
                                                                                                             
 (2) require the individual to maintain a daily log of all addresses 
the individual accesses through computer other than for authorized 
employment and to make this log available to the individual’s parole 
or probation agent; 
 . . .  
Subd. 3. Limits on restriction.  In imposing restrictions, the 
commissioner shall take into account that computers are used for 
numerous, legitimate purposes and that, in imposing restrictions, the 
least restrictive condition appropriate to the individual shall be used. 
Id. § 243.055. 
60 Beckman, 2003 WL 22774394 at *4.  See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025 (8th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 2003). 
61 S. 1979, 212th Legis. (N.J. 2006) (as passed by Senate, March 15, 2007) 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/S2000/1979_R2.PDF.  See State of New Jersey, 
Office of the Governor, Dec-27-07 Governor Codey Signs Legislation Making New Jersey a 
Leader in Cracking Down on Internet Predators, Dec. 27, 2007, 
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/approved/20071227a.html (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2007).  The bill passed in both houses and was signed by acting Governor Richard J. 
Codey on December 27, 2007.  Id.  The restrictions require Internet sex offenders to submit 
to periodic examinations of their computers, install monitoring software on their 
computers, inform law enforcement if they have access to computers or the Internet, and 
receive written approval from the state before using a computer or accessing the Internet.  
Id. 
62 S. 1979, 212th Legislature.  This bill is directed toward individuals convicted of a 
sexual offense, who are currently serving a special sentence of community or parole 
supervision for life or who have been adjudicated delinquent or found to be insane, and for 
whom a trier of fact has made a finding that a computer or any other device with Internet 
capability was used to facilitate the commission of the crime.  Id.  In those situations, the 
court shall order the following computer and Internet restrictions: 
(1) Prohibit the person from accessing or using a computer or any 
other device with Internet capability without the prior written 
approval of the court except, if such person is on probation or parole, 
the person may use a computer or any other device with Internet 
capability in connection with that person’s employment or search for 
employment with the prior approval of the person’s probation or 
parole officer; 
(2) Require the person to submit to periodic unannounced 
examinations of the person’s computer or any other device with 
Internet capability by a probation officer, parole officer, law 
enforcement officer or assigned computer or information technology 
specialist, including the retrieval and copying of all data from the 
computer or device and any internal or external peripherals and 
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submit to periodic, unannounced examinations of their computer 
equipment as well as to agree to the installation of government 
monitoring software on their hard drive.63  When this bill passed in 2007, 
New Jersey became one of few states with statutory language restricting 
computer and Internet access.64 
Minnesota and New Jersey are examples of states beginning to take a 
stand on the implementation of computer and Internet restrictions.65  In 
addition, Florida and Nevada have also imposed computer restrictions 
as a condition of their parole guidelines.66  Once the remaining states 
                                                                                                             
removal of such information, equipment or device to conduct a more 
thorough inspection; 
(3) Require the person to submit to the installation on the person’s 
computer or device with Internet capability, at the person’s expense, 
one or more hardware or software systems to monitor the Internet use; 
and 
(4) Require the person to submit to any other appropriate 
restrictions concerning the person’s use or access of a computer or any 
other device with Internet capability. 
Id.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008).  This bill was passed on 
December 27, 2007.  S1979, 212th Legis. (N.J. 2007) (as signed into law by Acting Governor 
Richard J. Codey).  See id. 
63 See Bills 2006–2007, Session Voting, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp 
(last visited October 13, 2007) (displaying a count of thirty-six yes votes and four 
nonvoters).  On March 15, 2007, after several amendments, the New Jersey Senate passed 
this bill in a 36-0 vote allowing for certain restrictions on Internet sex offenders’ computer 
and Internet privileges.  Id.  See also Tom Hester, Jr., N.J. Acts to Keep Sex Offenders Off 
Internet, PHILLY ONLINE, May 21, 2007, http://www.philly.com/philly/hp/news_update/ 
20070521_N_J__acts_to_keep_sex_offenders_off_Internet.html.  The measures also require 
that online dating services must disclose to New Jersey residents whether they do 
background checks on all individuals who participate in the dating service.  Id. 
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (restricting certain Internet sex offenders’ access to the 
Internet, this bill was signed into law on December 27, 2007).  See also Hester, supra note 63, 
at *1 (explaining that New Jersey was one of the few states that enforced computer and 
Internet restrictions). 
65 See MINN. STAT. § 243.055 (2003) (setting forth Minnesota’s law on computer and 
Internet restrictions for all offenders); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008) 
(setting forth New Jersey’s computer and Internet conditions for offenders on probation); 
Associated Press, Sex Offenders Are Barred from Internet by New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/nyregion/28offender.html?_r= 
1&oref=slogin (last visited Jan. 4, 2008) (describing the new computer restriction statute 
passed by New Jersey). 
66 See FLA. STAT. §§ 947.1405(7)(a)(7), 948.30(1)(g) (2007) (stating, “a prohibition on 
viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually 
stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer 
programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior 
pattern[]”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1)(q) (2006 & Supp. 2007) (stating that a defendant 
convicted of a sexual offense shall not “possess any electronic device capable of accessing 
the Internet and not access the Internet through any such device or any other means, unless 
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begin addressing computer and Internet sentencing restrictions for sex 
offenders, discrepancies will likely develop between the restrictions 
imposed by state courts and those imposed by federal courts.  Currently, 
inconsistencies already exist among the federal appellate courts 
regarding whether to impose computer and Internet restrictions for 
Internet sex offenders. 
C. Disagreement Among the Circuits 
Recently, computer and Internet restrictions imposed as conditions 
of the supervised release of Internet sex offenders have become 
increasingly common.67  In response, constitutional challenges to these 
restrictions have become common and typically assert that the 
restrictions are unnecessarily broad or that they amount to unreasonable 
liberty deprivations.68  The issue of whether to impose restrictions on 
computer use, Internet access, or both, has created a contradictory line of 
cases among the courts of appeals.69  Courts weigh several key factors to 
determine whether a condition of supervised release is incidental or 
necessary to prevent the crime from recurring.70  Appellate courts have 
upheld or overturned the holdings of district courts based on the district 
court’s analytical approach to specific facts of the cases; these decisions 
are discussed below.71 
                                                                                                             
possession of such a device or such access is approved”).  See also Hester, supra note 63, at 
*1 (providing examples of states with computer and Internet restriction statutes). 
67 Brian W. McKay, Note, Guardrails on the Information Superhighway:  Supervising 
Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 203, 220 (Fall 2003).   See 
infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing various circuit court holdings).   
68 See infra Part II.D (discussing the limited expectations of liberty deprivations for 
Internet sex offenders). 
69 Compare United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding an Internet 
prohibition where the defendant had used Internet communication to encourage 
exploitation of children by providing other pedophiles with advice on how to gain access 
to child victims), and United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(upholding a post-release ban on Internet use where the defendant had been convicted of 
receiving child pornography and had also engaged in sexual relations with an underage 
girl he had met via electronic mail), with United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (vacating an absolute Internet prohibition in the absence of evidence that the 
defendant had used the Internet to contact children), United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 
126–27 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating and remanding in a case involving a strict Internet 
prohibition, where the defendant had plead guilty to only receipt of child pornography), 
and United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding a ban on all 
computer and Internet use to be greater than necessary to serve the goals of supervised 
release, where the defendant had been convicted only of possession of child pornography). 
70 Jessica Habib, Note, Cyber Crime and Punishment:  Filtering Out Internet Felons, 14 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1051, 1063 (2004). 
71 See supra note 69 (discussing the various approaches taken by different circuit courts).  
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1. Some Courts Have Allowed Computer and Internet Use, Post-
Release, Supervision Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders  
In 1999, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was one of the 
first appellate courts to uphold computer and Internet use restrictions, 
and the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, 
and D.C. Circuits have since followed suit.72  In United States v. Crandon, 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the trial court’s 
imposition of certain supervised release restrictions on Defendant 
Richard Crandon (“Crandon”), which prohibited the defendant-sex 
offender from accessing any form of a computer network, bulletin board, 
Internet, or an exchange format involving computers, without prior 
approval from his probation officer, was not an abuse of discretion.73  In 
its analysis, the court acknowledged that the Internet has become an 
omnipresent aspect of American life.74  Yet, the court held that the 
restriction was narrowly tailored and directly related to the social 
policies of deterring Defendant Crandon from committing sexual crimes 
and also protecting society.75 
                                                 
72 See United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding district 
court’s imposition of computer and Internet restrictions for a released sex offender); United 
States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025 
(8th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (same); United 
States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Paul, 274 F.3d at 172 (same); 
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).  See also United States 
v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997).  The Sixth Circuit upheld a supervised release 
restriction in 1997, holding that most restrictions are valid if they are directly related to 
advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and protecting the public from repeat offenders.  
Id.    
73 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127.  Crandon was convicted of receiving child pornography after 
engaging in correspondence with a fourteen-year-old girl via the Internet.  Id. at 125.  After 
communicating with the girl through e-mail, the defendant drove from New Jersey to 
Minnesota, where he met the girl, engaged in sexual relations with her, and took 
approximately forty-eight photographs of her.  Id. 
74 Id. at 128.  Crandon challenged his post-release supervision restrictions, which 
prohibited him from accessing any form of a computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or 
an exchange format involving computers, without prior approval from his probation 
officer, arguing that it infringed on his liberty and bore no logical relation to his offense.  Id. 
at 127.  In addition, he argued that the condition would hamper his employment 
opportunities and infringe on his freedoms of speech and association.  Id. 
75 Id. at 127–28.  The court explained that a judge is given wide discretion in imposing 
supervised release.  Id. at 127.  Additionally, pursuant to section 3583 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code, a district court may order any appropriate condition as long as it 
(1) is reasonably related to certain factors, including (a) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant, (b) deterring further criminal conduct by the defendant, or 
(c) protecting the public from further criminal conduct by the 
defendant; and (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
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Similarly, in United States v. Paul, in 2001, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the imposition of a complete prohibition on 
any computer or Internet use for Robert Paul (“Paul”).76  The Paul court 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
condition of supervised release that prohibited the defendant-sex 
offender from possessing or accessing a computer and the Internet.77  
Although Paul argued that the Internet restriction was too broad, the 
court disagreed, and held that the prohibition of computer and Internet 
access was rationally related to Paul’s offense and was an appropriate 
public-protection measure.78 
In United States v. Walser, also in 2001, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that Russell Walser (“Walser”) was prohibited from 
using the Internet unless he had the permission of his probation officer.79  
                                                                                                             
reasonably necessary for the purposes of deterrence and protection of 
the public. 
Id.  See McKay, supra note 67, at 228 (comparing and contrasting the decisions of the federal 
circuits in regard to computer and Internet use restrictions); Habib, supra note 70, at 1070 
(same). 
76 Paul, 274 F.3d at 172.  Paul’s problem began the day he took his computer to a repair 
technician, who found child pornography on Paul’s computer and reported Paul to the FBI.  
Id. at 158.  FBI agents found evidence that Paul had downloaded several images of child 
pornography on his computer.  Id.  Additionally, with a search warrant, agents found 
pictures of children, magazines containing photographs of nude children, videotapes of 
children, and a large bag of children’s clothes.  Id.  Agents also found a medical bag 
containing basic medical supplies and Spanish-language fliers advertising free lice removal 
services and physical examinations of children which necessarily required them to 
completely undress.  Id. 
77 Id. at 167.  The district court was concerned with allowing Paul computer and Internet 
access after it learned that Paul’s computer had contained child pornography.  Id. at 168.  
Paul was sentenced to five years in prison and three years of supervised release with a 
complete ban on computer and Internet use.  Id. at 159–60.  Paul contended that the 
“blanket prohibition on computer or Internet use [wa]s excessively broad and [could not] 
be justified based solely on the fact that his offense involved a computer and the Internet.”  
Id. at 168.  Paul argued that computers and the Internet are “indispensible communication 
tools” in today’s society, and that this restriction would prevent him from “accessing 
computers and the Internet for legitimate purposes, such as word processing and 
[conducting] research.”  Id.  See Miller, supra note 11, at 19–20 (discussing the facts of Paul 
more in-depth). 
78 Paul, 274 F.3d at 171.  The court determined that Paul used the Internet to “encourage 
exploitation of children by seeking out fellow ‘boy lovers’ and providing them with advice 
on how to find and obtain access to ‘young friends.’”  Id. at 169.  Furthermore, the court 
concluded that Paul used his e-mail to “advise fellow consumers of child pornography 
[regarding] how to ‘scout’ single, dysfunctional parents and gain access to their children 
and to solicit the participation of like-minded individuals in trips to ‘visit’ children in 
Mexico.”  Id. at 168.  See also Miller, supra note 11, at 19 (discussing the outcome reached in 
Paul); McKay, supra note 67, at 224 (same); Habib, supra note 70, at 1071–72 (same). 
79 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2001).  During a drug 
investigation, police entered and searched Walser’s motel room.  Id. at 983.  The Criminal 
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In Walser, the court noted that the condition was not a complete ban on 
all Internet use and allowed Walser the opportunity to regain access to 
the Internet; therefore, it consequently upheld the Internet use 
restriction.80  However, the decision by the Walser court to uphold the 
Internet use restriction does not necessarily mean that the Tenth Circuit 
will uphold all future post-release supervision bans on Internet use.  In 
Walser, the court scrutinized whether the restriction on Walser imposed a 
greater deprivation than was necessary, but it did not determine whether 
Internet use restrictions would be proper in all instances.81  Instead, the 
court suggested that in determining the appropriateness of Internet use 
restrictions, the circumstances of the situation must be considered.  
Although the Tenth Circuit has not adopted a definitive stance on 
whether computer and Internet use restrictions during supervised 
release will be upheld, it did note that a valid condition would impose 
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.82 
More recently, in United States v. Sullivan, the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit considered for the first time whether Internet restrictions 
imposed during supervised release were proper.83  As a condition of his 
supervised release, Roger Sullivan (“Sullivan”) was forbidden from 
possessing or using a computer that had access to any online computer 
service at any location, including his place of employment, without prior 
                                                                                                             
Investigation Division conducted a forensic analysis of Walser’s computer and uncovered 
child pornography.  Id. at 984.  Walser pled guilty to possessing child pornography on his 
personal computer, was convicted, and was sentenced to twenty-seven months in prison 
and three years supervised release.  Id. at 985.  It was important to the court that the post-
release supervision restriction imposed allowed Walser to access the Internet as long as he 
first gained permission from his probation officer to do so.  Id. at 988. 
80 Id. at 988.  However, a concern that remains unaddressed is whether a probation 
officer might unreasonably restrict the defendant from accessing a central means of 
communication.  See id.  See also Miller, supra note 11, at 18 (discussing the facts in Walser 
and the court’s holding). 
81 Walser, 275 F.3d at 988.  Again, the court specifically questioned only whether the 
probation officer involved in the particular case would be impartial in deciding whether to 
allow the defendant to access the Internet.  Id. 
82 Id.  The court distinguished the condition imposed in Walser from that in White, noting 
the reasonableness of the restriction and the importance of a narrowly tailored restriction.  
Id. 
83 United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Roger Sullivan 
(“Sullivan”) was convicted of possessing and transporting child pornography via the 
Internet in violation of interstate commerce laws.  Id. at 885–86.  Sullivan pled guilty to one 
count of knowingly possessing child pornography images that were transported interstate 
via the Internet.  Id. at 885.  Over 75,000 files of pornographic images were found on 
Sullivan’s work computer and external hard drive.  Id. at 886.  Sullivan was sentenced to 
thirty months imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.  Id. at 887. 
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approval.84  The court reasoned that some measure of computer and 
Internet restriction was appropriate, and ultimately upheld the district 
court’s imposition of computer and Internet restrictions for Sullivan.85  
By contrast, not all courts have been willing to prohibit the use of 
computers or the Internet as post-release supervision restrictions for 
Internet sex offenders. 
2. Some Courts Have Not Allowed Computer and Internet Use, Post-
Release, Supervision Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders  
Some courts, such as the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, have declined to uphold computer and 
Internet use, post-release, supervision restrictions for Internet sex 
offenders, reasoning that computers and the Internet have become an 
indispensible way of life without which members of modern society 
cannot exist.86  For instance, in United States v. Sofsky, Gregory Sofsky 
(“Sofsky”) was convicted of receiving more than 1,000 images of child 
                                                 
84 Id.  See also United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).  The defendant 
was convicted of four counts of exploitation of a child and one count of distributing 
obscene material and was sentenced to seven years of probation.  Id. at 1304.  The court 
imposed as terms of his probation the prohibition of the “[I]nternet at any time unless work 
related during work hours.”  Id.  The court stated, “[i]t is always true of 
probationers . . . that they do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
[probation] restrictions.”  Id. at 1308 (alterations in original). 
85 Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 896.  One question before the court was whether downloading 
images from the Internet should be considered interstate commerce.  Id. at 886.  The court 
held that “because the images of child pornography were ‘instrumentalities’ or ‘things’ in 
interstate commerce and passed over the Internet, a ‘channel’ of interstate commerce, or, 
alternatively, because the conduct at issue—possession of child pornography—has a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce[,]” they are rightly regulated under the 
Commerce Clause.  Id. at 886–91. 
86 See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that while 
prohibiting Defendant Gregory Sofsky (“Sofsky”) from accessing a computer or Internet is 
reasonably related to the purposes of his sentencing, due to the nature of his offense, the 
condition inflicts a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary); United 
States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that a total ban on computer use 
and Internet access prevents access to an increasingly popular form of communication and 
also prevents everyday uses of the computer for checking the weather and news).  See also 
Habib, supra note 70, at 1064.  In a world of communications and information gathering, 
computer and Internet access are indispensible, and the mere fact that a computer with 
Internet access offers a medium through which abuse can occur is not a legitimate 
justification for imposing computer or Internet restrictions.  Id. (citing United States v. 
Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)).  For example, the fact that a defendant had used a 
phone to commit fraud would not substantially justify a condition of probation to bar his 
use of telephones.  Id. 
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pornography via the Internet.87  The defendant-sex offender’s supervised 
release sentence prohibited him from using a computer or the Internet 
without the approval of his probation officer, but the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and 
determined that these restrictions were improper.88  Although the court 
conceded that these restrictions were related to the purpose of 
sentencing, it concluded that the restrictions imposed a greater 
deprivation of Sofsky’s liberty than was necessary.89 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also overturned 
judicial decisions in which the lower courts had permitted computer and 
Internet use, post-release, supervision restrictions.90  For example, in 
                                                 
87 Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124, 126 (declining to uphold the post-release supervision 
restriction of an Internet sex offender because it completely banned all Internet use).  
Sofsky pled guilty to receiving child pornography based on evidence that he downloaded 
over 1,000 images from the Internet and had exchanged them online with others.  Id.  
Sofsky was sentenced to ten years in prison to be followed by a term of supervised release, 
during which time he was not allowed to have access to the computer or Internet without 
the approval of his probation officer.  Id.  Cf. Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895 (upholding the 
Internet restriction for an Internet sex offender released on probation, reasoning that it had 
a substantial relationship to the goal of supervised release). 
88 Id. at 127.  The court acknowledged that Sofsky’s access to computers and the Internet 
could facilitate quicker access to child pornography.  Id. at 126.  However, the court was 
still unwilling to allow the prohibition.  Id.  A total ban on the Internet would prevent 
access to e-mail, which has become a significant communication tool.  Id.  The court relied 
on United States v. Peterson, in which it had previously struck down an Internet ban 
imposed on a felon who had pleaded guilty to bank larceny and had previously been 
convicted of incest.  Id. (citing Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 82–84 (2d Cir. 2001)).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Peterson that the prohibition imposed was not 
reasonably related to Defendant Larry Peterson’s offense and that the value of the 
defendant’s ability to access the Internet outweighed the potential for abuse.  Peterson, 248 
F.3d at 83 (emphasis added).  See also MILLER, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the 
relationship between Peterson and Sofsky); Habib, supra note 70, at 1065–66 (same).   
89 Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.  The court supported its conclusion with the statutory language 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), defining the Sentencing Commission’s statement of policy.  Id.  The 
government contended during oral arguments that without a total ban on the defendant’s 
access to the Internet, it would not be able to sufficiently monitor Sofsky’s use of his 
computer.  Id.  The court responded by indicating that several alternatives for monitoring 
currently exist.  Id. at 126–27.  First, the probation officer could engage in unannounced 
monitoring to see if Sofsky was using his computer.  Id.  Second, the court could limit the 
type of sites that are accessible on Sofsky’s computer.  Id. at 127.  Last, the government 
could test Sofsky by inviting him to respond to advertisements for pornography placed by 
the government as part of a sting operation.  Id. 
90  See United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877–78 (7th Cir. 2003) (court was unwilling to 
allow for a complete ban of the Internet for the post-release supervision restriction of an 
Internet sex offender).  See also United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003).  The 
court decided that a total ban on access to Internet services, imposed on the defendant 
without advance notice, was impermissible, particularly given the open-ended nature of 
the delegation of power to the probation officer.  Id.  The case was remanded to the district 
court to consider a more narrowly tailored and precise set of rules.  Id. 
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United States v. Holm, Delbert Holm (“Holm”) was convicted of 
possessing child pornography that he had downloaded from the 
Internet.91  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a total 
ban on Holm’s use of the Internet was overly broad and imposed a 
greater deprivation of the defendant-sex offender’s liberty than was 
necessary, and thus failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirements of 
section 3583(d)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code.92  The appellate 
                                                 
91 Holm, 326 F.3d at 877–78.  Holm was an information system technologist who pled 
guilty to possession of child pornography.  Id. at 873–74.  The defendant downloaded more 
than 100,000 pornographic images of which approximately 10–20 percent were children 
performing sexually explicit activities.  Id.  At his initial sentencing hearing, the court 
imposed several supervised release conditions, including the use or possession of any 
computer with Internet capabilities.  Id.  In his defense, Holm presented evidence that he 
had not used any of the computers from work in the commission of his crimes.  Id. at 878.  
The court ultimately declined to uphold the complete ban on Holm’s access to the Internet.  
Id.   
But see generally United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (where the 
defendant was convicted of the use of interstate facilities to transmit information about a 
minor child with the intent to solicit any person to engage in sexual activity with the minor, 
the court affirmed the special condition prohibiting the defendant from using or possessing 
a computer with Internet access); McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 
(where the defendant was convicted of child molestation and prohibited from using any 
computer with access to any online computer service without prior approval; the 
reviewing court held this was reasonably related to defendant’s successful reintegration 
into the community and served to protect the public and prevent future criminal activity); 
People v. Crumpler, No. E034407, 2005 WL 428468 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005) (unpublished) 
(where the defendant was convicted of solicitation of a lewd act upon a child and 
sentenced to refrain from using any computer with access to the Internet and to refrain 
from using any other computer except in the course of his employment; the reviewing 
court upheld the condition reasoning that it would only be invalid if it had no relationship 
to the crime involved); Brown v. Cockrell, No. 3-02-CV-2433-N, 2003 WL 21458751 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 29, 2003) (where the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and 
indecency with a child; the court upheld a restriction prohibiting the defendant from 
owning or operating a computer or photographic equipment); Smith v. State, 779 N.E.2d 
111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (where the defendant was convicted of child molestation and was 
prohibited from using any computer or having access to any online computer service; the 
court declared the condition valid because it was intended to prevent the defendant from 
viewing prohibited materials); State v. McKinney, 750 N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) 
(where the defendant was prosecuted for rape after previously being convicted of gross 
sexual imposition; one of the conditions required that the defendant not own computers 
and stay off of the Internet, and the reviewing court upheld this condition explaining that 
the defendant’s access to pornography was not in the defendant’s or society’s best interest 
and the Internet was the gateway to too many pornographic websites).  There are several 
cases in which courts have upheld computer and Internet restrictions, even if neither 
computers nor Internet access was used in the facilitation of a crime.  See, e.g., Taylor, 338 
F.3d 1280; Crumpler, 2005 WL 428468; Cockrell, 2003 WL 21458751; McVey, 863 N.E.2d 434; 
Smith, 779 N.E.2d 111; McKinney, 750 N.E.2d 1237. 
92 Holm, 326 F.3d at 877–78.  The court noted that during the sentencing hearing, Holm 
pointed out that he had almost thirty years of employment in computerized 
telecommunications and that prohibiting him from the use of computers with network 
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court acknowledged that it was understandable that the lower court was 
inclined to impose a ban on Internet use, given the severity of the 
defendant’s sex offenses for which he was convicted, coupled with the 
fact that he had used the Internet to commit them, but it nonetheless held 
that a strict ban prohibiting all Internet use is counterproductive to 
enabling an individual to perform routine life tasks after being released 
from incarceration.93  The court reasoned that the because the supervised 
release restrictions as written had the potential to affect the sex 
offender’s future productivity and jeopardize his rehabilitation, they 
violated section 3583(d) of Title 18 of the United States Code.94   
                                                                                                             
connectivity would burden his ability to be a productive person in this type of work 
environment.  Id.  But see United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Crandon also tried to argue that as businesses continue to integrate computers and Internet 
into the workplace, such a restriction would hamper his employment opportunities.  Id.  
The court in Crandon held that the restrictions were permissible, though, because they were 
narrowly tailored and directly related to deterring Crandon from criminal activity and to 
protecting the public.  Id.  See also State v. Ehli, 681 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 2004).  In Ehli, the 
defendant pled guilty to continuous sexual abuse of a minor, and the trial court imposed as 
a probation condition a complete bar on contact with minor children and Internet access.  
Id. at 809. The defendant argued that his occupation involved computers and access to the 
Internet, but the court held that the bar on Internet access was reasonably related to the 
offense committed.  Id. at 811.   
93 Holm, 326 F.3d at 878.  “[F]or example, the government strongly encourages taxpayers 
to file their returns electronically, where more and more commerce is conducted on-line, 
and where vast amounts of government information are communicated via website[.]”  Id.  
The Holm court, along with the Sofsky court, stated that various forms of Internet 
supervision could be implemented to provide a middle ground between an absolute ban 
on computer and Internet use and no restriction whatsoever on computer or Internet use to 
allow a released sex offender to function in the modern world.  Id. at 877–78.  See also 
Correll, supra note 45, at 684–86 (discussing the different implications of an absolute ban on 
computer and Internet use); Miller, supra note 11, at 18 (comparing absolute bans with 
absolutely no bans).   
94 Holm, 326 F.3d at 878.  See supra note 91 (noting that sometimes courts will hold a 
condition valid even if computer or Internet use was not a part of the commission of the 
crime).  However, the following cases involve sexual crimes where the post-release 
supervision restrictions were held to be invalid.  See generally United States v. Feigenbaum, 
99 Fed. Appx. 782 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant was convicted of transporting a minor with 
the intent to engage in sexual activity, and the court held that restricting the defendant’s 
Internet use was ambiguous because it was not clear whether the defendant was 
completely banned from the Internet or whether he could use the Internet subject to 
approval); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2003) (defendant pled guilty to 
persuading a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing 
visual depictions, and the court held the condition of prohibiting possession of a computer 
with access to the Internet invalid pursuant to the reasoning in Sofsky); Foster v. State, 813 
N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (defendant was guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor 
and prohibited from possessing or viewing any pornographic or sexually explicit material 
on computer or Internet files, and the court found this restriction to be too broad and not 
sufficiently clear to inform the defendant as to what type of behavior was and was not 
allowed); Fitzgerald v. State, 805 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (defendant was convicted 
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In addition, although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
upheld the defendant’s post-release supervision restriction prohibiting 
computer and Internet use in Crandon in 1999, the court was not willing 
to uphold a similar post-release supervision restriction prohibiting 
Defendant Robb Freeman’s (“Freeman”) computer and Internet use in 
United States v. Freeman in 2003.95 The Freeman court held that the 
prohibition on computer possession and Internet access was overbroad, 
and in doing so, distinguished its decision from its earlier opinion in 
Crandon.96  It noted that there was no evidence in the record to suggest 
that Defendant Freeman had used the Internet to contact children or that 
he had built his child pornography collection through online activities, 
whereas in Crandon, the defendant had used the Internet to contact 
minor children and solicit inappropriate sexual contact.97  Therefore, the 
Freeman court held that because the evidence did not indicate that 
Freeman had used a computer or the Internet to commit the sex offenses 
for which he was convicted, the computer and Internet restriction 
imposed on Freeman involved a greater deprivation of liberty than was 
reasonably necessary.98 
                                                                                                             
of sexual misconduct with a minor and received similar prohibitions as the defendant in 
Foster, and the court again held the language of the restriction to be unconstitutionally 
vague and remanded the case).   
95 United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that there was no 
need to totally eliminate Freeman’s computer or Internet access when a more narrow 
restriction was available).  See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127 (upholding the computer and 
Internet restrictions imposed by the district court). 
96 Freeman, 316 F.3d at 391–92.  Freeman was arrested after an undercover customs 
agent, in a face-to-face meeting, permitted Freeman to copy computer files containing child 
pornography.  Id. at 387.  In addition to determining Freeman’s sentence, the court also 
imposed special conditions on Freeman’s supervised release.  Id. at 389.  The defendant was 
not allowed to possess or use a computer with Internet service, or have any computer 
equipment at his home.  Id. at 389–90.  In addition, the defendant was required to submit to 
all unannounced examinations of his residence and possessions.  Id. at 390.  More 
specifically, the court determined that there was no need to totally eliminate Freeman’s 
access to e-mail or the Internet when a more focused restriction, limited to pornographic 
sites and images, could be enforced.  Id. at 392.  See also McKay, supra note 67, at 228 
(distinguishing Freeman from Crandon).   
97 Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392.  The record gave no explanation of the origin of Freeman’s 
collection of child pornography or whether his collection was built through online 
activities.  Id.  See McKay, supra note 67, at 229 (noting that the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit failed to consider, or considered unimportant, the online activities that likely 
led to Freeman’s collection of child pornography).  Compare Freeman, 316 F.3d at 387 (in 
which Freeman was convicted only of copying hard files from an undercover detective and 
possessing images on his computer of child pornography), with Crandon, 173 F.3d at 124–26 
(in which Crandon used the Internet to contact minors and solicit inappropriate sexual 
contact). 
98  Freeman, 316 F.3d at 391–92. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also articulated 
distinctions between cases it decided.  Unlike in Walser, where the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the Internet use, post-release, 
restriction that was imposed on the defendant, in United States v. White, 
the same court determined that a similar post-release supervision 
restriction was overreaching.99  In White, the trial court ordered Robert 
White (“White”) not to possess a computer with Internet access 
throughout the period of his supervised release.100  The Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit overturned the trial court’s holding, however, 
reasoning that the post-release supervision restriction was overreaching 
because it prevented White from having access to the Internet.101  In sum, 
the struggle among circuit courts to balance the liberty interests of 
Internet sex offenders with society’s interests of safety and security has 
resulted in much disagreement regarding whether computer and 
Internet use restrictions are appropriate as conditions of the supervised 
release of Internet sex offenders. 
D. Limited Expectations of Liberty—From Felon to Internet Sex Offender 
Individuals possess a reasonable expectation of privacy when using 
their home computers.102  However, as the court stated in Guest v. Leis, an 
                                                 
99  Compare United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
special conditions were too narrow and overly broad), and infra note 182 (giving examples 
of conditions that are both too narrow and overly broad), with United States v. Walser, 275 
F.3d 981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the prohibition on Internet use was sufficiently 
and narrowly tailored because the prohibition allowed for an exception if the sex offender 
obtained permission from the probation officer to access the Internet). 
100 White, 244 F.3d at 1201.  In 1996, White responded to an advertisement on the Internet 
for videos of young girls engaged in sexual intercourse; however, this was a sting operation 
by United States Customs officials.  Id. White was arrested and convicted of receiving child 
pornography and violating a special condition of release.  Id.  He objected to three of the 
five supervised release conditions, arguing that the ban on possession of a computer with 
Internet access infringed on his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id. at 
1202. 
101 Id. at 1206.  The court reasoned that if the restriction was overreaching, it would 
prevent White from using a computer at the library to do any research, get a weather 
forecast, or read a newspaper online. Id.  One question the court raised was as follows: 
Although Mr. White may still technically possess a computer for 
word processing and record keeping, most computers now are 
equipped with an internal modem, rendering any use of the computer 
a possible access to the Internet.  Without more, does his mere 
possession of such a computer equate to violating the special 
condition?  
Id. at 1205 n.7. 
102 United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).  See also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 
F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a shared computer if his log-in is password-protected and that no other person 
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individual loses that expectation of privacy after his transmissions, sent 
via the Internet or through e-mail, have reached the recipient.103  In 
United States v. Lifshitz, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed, for the first time, the government’s interest in imposing 
conditions restricting a defendant-sex offender’s computer and Internet 
use.104  The court noted the government’s interest not only in deterring 
the sex offender from reengaging in old behavior but also in controlling 
the defendant’s computer and Internet access as a means of 
rehabilitation.105  The Lifshitz court suggested that a close and substantial 
relationship between the governmental interest and the condition 
imposed must exist in order for computer and Internet use restrictions to 
be proper.106  Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that individuals on 
probation would have a reduced expectation of privacy.107 
                                                                                                             
could consent to a search of the protected personal computer files); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 
325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Home owners would of course have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their homes and in their belongings—including computers—inside the home.”); 
Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an employee “had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his office computer[]”). 
103 Guest, 255 F.3d at 333 (comparing an e-mail to a letter sent through the mail, the court 
concluded that once the recipient took possession, the sender no longer held any 
expectation of privacy).  In Guest, a task force investigating online obscenity seized two 
computer bulletin board systems operated by Cincinnati Computer Connection Bulletin 
Board System.  Id. at 330.  Users of the bulletin boards were able to access e-mail, chat 
rooms, online games, and conferences, where they could post or read messages on many 
topics and download pictures.  Id. 
104 Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 189.  Brandon Lifshitz (“Lifshitz”) was arrested after government 
agents investigated his home computer and found pornographic images of children.  Id. at 
175.  Lifshitz pled guilty to one count of receiving illegal images.  Id. at 176.  The court 
sentenced Lifshitz to three years of supervised release during which time he was required 
to consent to the installation of monitoring software and filter devices on his personal 
computer and any other computer he owned.  Id. at 177. 
105 Id. at 189.  The court addressed the following three issues in the context of monitoring 
Lifshitz’s computer use:  (1) the government’s interest in the particular condition; (2) the 
expectation of privacy of the offender; and (3) the scope and efficiency of the condition.  Id. 
at 189–90. 
106 Id. at 192–93.  See MILLER, supra note 10, at 6 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), applied to the computer monitoring 
of convicted sex offenders, where the court looked to the following two factors:  (1) the 
degree to which the search intruded upon an individual’s privacy, and (2) the degree of 
intrusion needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests). 
107 Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 190.  The court summarized its analysis by stating, “While the 
extent to which a probationer’s privacy interests are implicated depends on the type of 
monitoring implemented[,] . . . they are, in any event, reduced by the very fact that he 
remains subject to federal probation.”  Id.  (citing United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 457 
(2d Cir. 2002)).  See also United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).  In 
Yuknavich, Timothy K. Yuknavich (“Yuknavich”) was discovered printing out pictures of 
child pornography at work and using his work computer to access pornographic images of 
children.  Id. at 1304.  Yuknavich pled guilty and received seven years of probation, 
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Another case focusing on a defendant-sex offender’s expectation of 
privacy is United States v. Balon, in which the court held that offenders on 
supervised release must endure a “diminished expectation of privacy 
that is inherent in the very term of ‘supervised release.’”108  Unlike Lifshitz, 
the Balon court reviewed the factors laid out in the Sentencing Guidelines 
when it examined the restrictions imposed on Defendant Stephen A. 
Balon (“Balon”).109  In reviewing the remote monitoring conditions and 
the resulting implications for Balon’s expectation of privacy, the court 
held that the government may employ such techniques to monitor 
Balon’s behavior without harming his very limited expectation of 
privacy.110 
                                                                                                             
conditioned by not being able to access the Internet unless such use was work-related and 
during working hours.  Id.  In considering Yuknavich’s expectation of privacy in his 
computer and computer related activities, the court considered the crime for which 
Yuknavich was on probation.  Id. at 1310.  The court stated that possession of child 
pornography is not a victimless crime and if the Internet restriction did not provide officers 
with the ability to examine Yuknavich’s actions, then there would have been little reason 
for it to exist.  Id.  The court further noted that Yuknavich’s expectation of privacy was 
reduced because of the actions he engaged in while on probation.  Id.  Because Yuknavich 
had repeatedly violated the terms of his release after being given several chances to correct 
his behaviors, he should have reasonably expected to be more closely monitored by 
probation officers.  Id. 
108 United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Reyes, 238 F.3d at 460).  
Stephen A. Balon (“Balon”), a computer technician at a computer store, was convicted of 
one count of transporting child pornography in interstate commerce through the use of a 
computer.  Id. at 41.  Balon was caught trading movies and still images of pre-pubescent 
children engaged in explicit sexual activity with adults.  Id.  Balon’s computer contained 
approximately 2,000 still images and 200 movie files of young children engaged in sexual 
conduct.  Id.  In addition, Balon had a prior conviction relating to Internet trading of child 
pornography and was a convicted sex offender because he had previously been convicted 
of sexually abusing his nine-year-old step sister.  Id.  Not only did Balon possess files on his 
computer, but agents also found compact discs in his vehicle that showed video files of 
children who had visited his workplace.  Id. 
109 Id. at 42.  Balon challenged the conditions of his supervised release sentence under 
various theories, but principally on the grounds that they were not reasonably related to 
his conviction and that they constituted a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably 
necessary.  Id. at 41.  Due to Balon’s status as a child sex offender and his admitted sexual 
interest in children, the court imposed the following three conditions on Balon’s use of 
computers.  Id.  First, Balon was required to provide advance notice before using any 
computer, automated service, or connected device during his supervision.  Id.  Second, the 
probation office was authorized to install any application necessary on computers or 
connected devices to randomly monitor the defendant’s media.  Id.  Last, Balon had to 
consent to and cooperate with unannounced examinations of computer equipment he 
owned or used.  Id.  See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d) (2006) (providing the statutory 
language that the court considered in rendering its opinion).   
110 Id. at 45.  Balon’s appeal was ultimately dismissed for lack of ripeness, and the district 
court was ordered to review the supervised release conditions at a time closer to Balon’s 
release into the program.  Id. at 47.  The court was insistent on examining the effectiveness 
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The Sentencing Guidelines have provided a balancing test for courts 
to use when determining whether computer and Internet restrictions are 
warranted.111  One question unanswered by the Sentencing Guidelines 
and corresponding case law, however, is whether these computer and 
Internet restrictions should be allowed at all, given the vast presence of 
computers and the Internet in modern society.112  Currently, when 
Internet sex offenders are released into society after their incarceration, 
courts have to balance two duties in determining which type of 
probation restrictions are appropriate:  (1) protecting citizens from those 
individuals who may reoffend, and (2) protecting the liberty interests of 
released individuals.113  Therefore, computer and Internet restrictions 
should be warranted in circumstances where the punishment is 
proportionate to the crime and the restriction provides the proper public 
protection while minimizing liberty deprivations. 
III.  WEIGHING THE OPTIONS:  EXPECTATIONS V. RIGHTS 
The Internet provides an anonymous forum for users to create new 
identities and engage in new and different modes of expression and 
presentation.114  In view of this reality, computer and Internet use 
restrictions enhance public safety and prevent criminal activity.115  
However, opponents of computer and Internet restrictions look to the 
                                                                                                             
and precision of proposed computer monitoring software and weighing the software’s 
potential advantages with the likely downsides.  Id. at 46–47. 
111 Habib, supra note 70, at 1056. 
112 Id.  See John B. Horrigan, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, A TYPOLOGY OF 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY USERS 2 (May 7, 2007), 
http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP_ICT_Typology.pdf.  In United States households, 
Internet access grew from less than forty-five percent in 2000 to over sixty percent in early 
2007.  Id.  See also Correll, supra note 45, at 684–86 (describing the prevalence of the Internet 
in modern day society). 
113 Habib, supra note 70, at 1056.  See infra Part III.D (analyzing policy reasoning in 
support of computer and Internet restrictions).  See generally McKay, supra note 67, at 234.  
There are two types of supervised release conditions, reactive and proactive measures.  Id.  
Reactive measures require the officer to respond to a potential violation, whereas proactive 
measures are implemented to prevent future recurrences.  Id. 
114 Correll, supra note 45, at 689.  See YNONNE JEWKES & KEITH SHARP, DOT.CONS:  CRIME, 
DEVIANCE, AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET, Crime Deviance and the Disembodied Self:  
Transcending the Dangers of Corporeality, 1–4 (Yvonne Jewkes ed., 2003).  This anonymity 
allows criminals to commit a range of crimes from the passive and relatively harmless to 
the damaging and dangerous.  Id.  See also Jay Krasovec, Comment, Cybersapce:  The Final 
Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101 (1997) (discussing how users of the Internet 
can remain anonymous). 
115 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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pervasiveness of computers and the Internet in society and argue that an 
individual has a right to access this prevalent form of communication.116 
Part III.A analyzes arguments both for and against diminishing the 
liberty interests for Internet sex offenders.117  Next, Part III.B discusses 
the similarities and differences among the reasoning proffered by federal 
appellate courts.118  Then, Part III.C considers New Jersey’s approach to 
computer and Internet restrictions for Internet sex offenders on 
supervised release.119  Finally, Part III.D addresses public policy 
considerations in support of computer and Internet use restrictions for 
Internet sex offenders.120 
A. Should Internet Sex Offenders Have a Diminished Expectation of Freedom? 
1. Arguments in Favor of Implementing Computer and Internet, Post-
Release, Supervision Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders 
As one commentator so aptly articulated, “Where a condition 
deprives a defendant of liberty or property, the condition must involve 
no greater diminishment than is necessary to protect the public from the 
defendant’s future crimes, deter future criminal conduct, or provide 
correctional treatment and training in an effective manner.”121  Courts 
allowing a ban on computer and Internet use hold that when a restriction 
is reasonably tailored to the offender’s offense and the restriction serves 
the dual purpose of deterrence and public protection, the restriction is 
allowed.122  The defendant-sex offender’s arguments in Crandon failed to 
persuade the court that the computer and Internet use prohibition would 
                                                 
116 See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing against recognizing that Internet sex offenders have 
diminished liberty interests). 
117 See infra Part III.A (discussing whether a diminished expectation of freedom should 
apply to Internet sex offenders). 
118 See infra Part III.B (analyzing whether federal courts of appeals have identified an 
underlying distinction between cases). 
119 See infra Part III.C (discussing New Jersey’s statute, which imposes Internet 
restrictions for sex offenders). 
120 See infra Part III.D (discussing policy reasons in support of computer and Internet 
restrictions). 
121 McKay, supra note 67, at 220.  McKay distinguishes between probation and supervised 
release in accordance with statutes 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) and § 3583(d).  Id.  McKay restates 
the analysis courts apply when determining whether an imposed condition meets the 
elements set out in section 3583 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  Id.; see also United 
States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 
733 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 987–88 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 
(10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999). 
122 See supra Part II.C (discussing the holdings and reasoning put forth by circuit courts 
regarding computer and Internet use restrictions). 
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unnecessarily restrict career opportunities and freedom of speech and 
expression.123  The Crandon court based its holding on the fact that the 
special condition was narrowly tailored, served a direct purpose of 
deterring Crandon from reoffending, and protected the public.124 
The Crandon court’s reasoning is persuasive.  First, Defendant 
Crandon used the Internet to develop an illegal sexual relationship with 
a young girl.125  The court explained that the condition limiting 
Crandon’s use of the Internet was directly related to the government’s 
compelling purpose of “deterring [Crandon] from engaging in further 
criminal conduct[.]”126  Second, the condition provided the opportunity 
for Crandon to gain permission from his probation officer to access a 
computer and the Internet.127  This language strengthened the argument 
that the special condition was “narrowly tailored and [was] directly 
related to deterring Crandon and protecting the public.”128 
Proponents of computer and Internet use, post-release, supervision 
restrictions for sex offenders argue that Internet access is a privilege—
not an essential element to everyday living.129  Opponents, on the other 
hand, argue that banning computer and Internet access for individuals 
who commit computer crimes is analogous to banning telephone use for 
individuals who commit fraud offenses by use of the telephone.130  This 
analogy is inaccurate for a few reasons.131  First, to compare deprivation 
                                                 
123 See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128.  Crandon was not only convicted of receiving child 
pornography, but also of using the Internet to develop a relationship with a young girl.  Id. 
at 127. 
124 Id. at 128.  See also United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
even though supervised release restrictions may affect constitutional rights, most 
restrictions are valid if directly related to advancing the released offender’s rehabilitation 
and protecting the public from recidivism). 
125 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text; supra Part II.C.1 (describing the facts of 
Crandon). 
126 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127–28.  See also United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 168 (5th Cir. 
2001) (noting the strong ties between Paul’s dangerous behavior and computer activities, 
and ultimately upholding the computer and Internet restrictions imposed on him). 
127 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127. 
128 Id. at 128.  The court explained that when the district court imposed the conditions, it 
carefully considered Crandon’s prior conduct and the need to protect the public, thus not 
abusing its broad discretion.  Id. 
129 Habib, supra note 70, at 1078.  Courts, such as the White court, have put more 
emphasis on the use of the Internet to facilitate the crime, as opposed to the Internet’s role 
in society.  Id.  Contra United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001).  The Peterson 
court noted that “[c]omputers and [the] Internet . . . have become virtually indispensible in 
the modern world of communications and information gathering.”  Id. at 83. 
130 See Habib, supra note 70, at 1064 (citing Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83). 
131 See McKay, supra note 67, at 236–38 (describing the inaccuracies of the analogy).  See, 
e.g., Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83 (putting forth the telephone analogy); United States v. White, 
244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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of the telephone with deprivation of the Internet is misleading.132  While 
both are prevalent forms of communication in today’s society, they serve 
different purposes.  If a person is deprived of using his telephone, he is 
prohibited from using one of the most basic forms of communication in 
today’s society, a form of communication that most people would agree 
is absolutely necessary.133  In contrast, the Internet, while prevalent, does 
not enable an individual to perform any task which cannot be achieved 
by some alternate method or means, such as by the telephone.134  While 
the Internet may be a popular tool of choice, there are plenty of other 
channels of communication an individual may access more (or just as) 
easily, such as a telephone, which is not necessarily the case if a person is 
banned from a telephone.135  The Internet provides a forum that is 
convenient, but it has yet to become a communication medium that is 
accessed exclusively for a specific purpose or with the same frequency as 
the telephone.136  While it is powerful and has become an increasingly 
popular means of communication in today’s society, it is still incapable 
                                                 
132 See McKay, supra note 67, at 236–38.  See also Louis Llovio, Cell Phones Increasingly 
Replace Standard Home Phone, THE BALTIMORE DAILY RECORD, Oct. 6, 2006, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20061006/ai_n16773947 (last visited Jan. 
5, 2008).  As the number of cell phones increases, the number of landlines decreases.  Id.  
According to the 2006 U.S. Census American Fact Finder report, over five million 
Americans do not have landlines at home.  Id.  A trade group for wireless carriers reported 
that over 72 percent of Americans have cellular telephones.  Id.  Therefore, courts might 
face the following problem in the future when restricting Internet access:  because many 
cell phones on today’s market are Internet accessible, probation or parole officers must 
consider this point when enforcing Internet restrictions.   
133 See McKay, supra note 67, at 236–38.  The telephone is especially important for making 
emergency phone calls.  Id. at 236.  While the Internet is powerful, it is still incapable of 
performing tasks that have been dominated by the telephone for the past few decades.  Id. 
134 Id.  McKay notes that through the Internet, information is placed at our fingertips, 
only a click away.  Id.  Everyday activities have been made easier, but there is little that can 
be done in the virtual world that cannot be accomplished in the physical world.  Id. 
135 Id. at 236–38.  Although likely not as efficient as the Internet, the defendant still has 
the ability to purchase newspapers, magazines, watch television, and listen to the radio as 
forums for news and weather.  In addition, the defendant has the ability to communicate 
through telephone conversations and postal mail.  Banning the Internet does not prohibit 
the offender from accessing current information pertaining to what is going on in the 
world. 
136 Id.  McKay suggests that until the Internet is used for exclusive, privileged purposes, 
courts should consider the available alternatives when determining whether a ban is 
overbroad.  Id. at 237.  See Correll, supra note 45, at 685.  Recent surveys indicate that 
Internet usage among Americans has reached an all-time high, with more than seventy 
percent of Americans reportedly using the Internet on a regular basis.  Id.  The Internet 
provides a forum for communication, research, job hunting, and access to government 
information.  Id.  What was once considered a luxury and business device can now be 
considered to serve a common purpose in daily life.  Id. at 684. 
Blaisdell: Protecting the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First Century: Analyzing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1190 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
of performing tasks that have been dominated by the telephone for the 
past few decades, such as initiating contact with emergency 911 services. 
The second flaw in the telephone analogy is the failure to recognize 
the degree to which public safety interests are served by post-release 
supervision restrictions for sex offenders.137  The government’s interest 
in protecting the public from potential repeat offenders is significant.138  
Internet sexual crimes are personal crimes—the offender has sought out 
a victim and personally made an attack on him.139  In the age of the 
Internet, pedophiles are able to communicate easily with vulnerable 
children.140  Offenders enter American homes without even knocking—
all they need is a computer, Internet connection, and parents who are not 
closely monitoring their child’s Internet activity.141  Considering the ease 
with which an offender may electronically enter a home, it is no wonder 
why courts have given greater deference to the government’s interest in 
protecting society than to the liberty interests of convicted Internet sex 
offenders.142 
                                                 
137 See McKay, supra note 67, at 236–38. 
138 United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that there is a 
“strong link between child pornography and the Internet, and the need to protect the 
public, particularly children, from sex offenders[]”).  See supra note 47 (laying out the 
government’s interests that are targeted with supervised conditions). 
139 See McKay, supra note 67, at 237 (defining personal crimes).  See also Christa M. Book, 
Do You Really Know Who is on the Other Side of Your Computer Screen? Stopping Internet 
Crimes Against Children, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 749, 757–58 (2004).  Sex abuse victims have 
scars that are more than skin deep.  Id.  This specific abuse can cause victims to suffer from 
“depression, eating disorders, distrust, [and] sexual dysfunction[.]”  Id. at 758 (quoting Julie 
Posey, They Call Me Kendra:  A Crimefighter’s Personal Story and Battle Against Online 
Pedophiles 114, 159 (2002)) (alteration in original).  In addition, these persons may also suffer 
from self-destructive behaviors, alcohol or drug abuse, excessive risk taking, and 
sometimes suicide attempts.  Id. at 758. 
140 See Book, supra note 139, at 750 (describing how easy it is for pedophiles to 
communicate with children).  See also Correll, supra note 45, at 690.  The Internet allows sex 
offenders to remain anonymous to the general public.  Id.  Their false identities aid Internet 
sex offenders in concealing their true identities while at the same time creating barriers for 
investigative activities.  Id.  Soliciting victims in cyberspace makes it difficult for police 
officials to track down and match an actual person to a web address.  Id. 
141 See Book, supra note 1139, at 750 (describing the ease with which Internet sex offenders 
gain access to children through computers and Internet).  Correll, supra note 45, at 691.  
Arguably, the solicitation of a child or teenager would most likely not have happened but 
for the offender’s access to the Internet.  Id.  Internet sex offenders using the Internet find 
their victims anonymously and with minimal fear of being captured.  Id.  Access to 
computers has allowed Internet sex offenders to expand their victim pool and also to 
engage in deviant behavior, such as trading child pornography with others who share the 
same interests.  Id. at 690–91. 
142 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing cases in which courts have upheld computer and 
Internet use restrictions as supervised release conditions). 
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Courts hold that when the government has a substantial interest in 
protecting the public, a restriction must be reasonably related to 
attaining that goal.143  For example, one could argue that requiring a sex 
offender to give advance notice of computer use arguably causes more 
inconvenience than is reasonably necessary to attain the court’s goal of 
deterrence because it requires the individual to give advance notice for 
all computer use, which would theoretically require reporting in 
advance the use of all automated banking and electronic airport check-in 
machines because these devices are technically computers.144  However, 
in Balon, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this 
argument posited by Balon and instead determined that the requirement 
that a sex offender give advance notice of computer use was reasonable 
and reasonably necessary to achieving the goal of protecting the 
public.145  To support its conclusion, the court noted that conditions of 
supervised release need only “give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,” and as such, a 
requirement such as the one imposed on Balon clearly satisfies this 
goal.146 
When an Internet sex offender uses the Internet to communicate 
with vulnerable children, whom society has a compelling interest to 
protect, restrictions on the sex offender’s First Amendment rights must 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
limiting Internet access is “reasonably related” to the offense and to the “goal of deterring 
him[,] [the Internet sex offender],” “rehabilitation[,]” and “protecting the public[]”); United 
States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a “limited restriction on a 
sex offender’s Internet use is a necessary and reasonable condition of supervised 
release[]”); United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that while 
prohibiting access to the Internet without approval was “reasonably related to the purposes 
of his sentencing,” the condition inflicted too great a deprivation on liberty); United States 
v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 168 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that “prohibiting Paul from using a 
computer or the Internet is rationally related to his offense and that such an order is an 
appropriate public protection measure[]”); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that a condition restricting Internet access was “reasonably related . . . to 
the goal of deterring [Defendant Crandon] from engaging in further criminal conduct[]”). 
144 See MILLER, supra note 10, at 7–8.  Not long after the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decided Lifshitz, it analyzed the reasonableness of computer and Internet in Balon.  
Id.  See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text (discussing the facts in Balon). 
145 United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 2004).  The court was aware of the 
district court’s concern in preventing Balon from trading child pornography in the future.  
Id.  The notification provision obligated Balon to notify the probation office only of the use 
of a computer “able to obtain, store, or transmit illicit sexual depictions” of minor children.  
Id.  The purpose of the provision was to monitor Balon’s intake of information at any 
computer, not just his personal computer.  Id. 
146 Id. (quoting United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
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be held valid.147  In United States v. Loy, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that a narrowly tailored probationary condition 
cannot restrict First Amendment freedoms unless the probationary 
condition has some benefit to public safety.148  To this point, the 
government has a significant interest in protecting the public, 
particularly children, from abuse by Internet sex offenders.149  Sex 
offenders who commit acts of sexual violence against children have one 
of the highest rates of recidivism among all criminals; thus, the 
government is justified in limiting the liberty interests of those sex 
offenders who are on supervised release.150  However, not everyone 
agrees.151 
                                                 
147 See generally United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2 
(9th Cir. May 20, 1998); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127–28 (rejecting First Amendment challenges 
to probation conditions). 
148 United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001).  Ray Loy was convicted of 
possession of child pornography, some of which he helped produce.  Id. at 254.  While 
Loy’s supervised release conditions did not involve restrictions on Internet access, Loy 
contested the restriction of his possession of any pornography.  Id. at 255. 
149 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL 
REPORT, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders, 2006, 1, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).   “Child 
sex offenses [are] among the fastest growing offenses of the Federal criminal caseload from 
1994 to 2006[.]”  Id.  In 2006, child pornography made up 69 percent of the total number of 
sex offense cases referred to United States Attorneys’ Offices.  Id. 
150  UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Criminal 
Offender Statistics, Summary Findings, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
crimoff.htm (click “Child Victimizers” link) (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).  According to the 
United States Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 1994, approximately 
272,111 persons were released from prisons.  Id. at “Recidivism.”  Of those persons, within 
three years of release, 2.5 percent of charged rapists were rearrested for rape, and 1.2 
percent of those serving time for homicide were rearrested for another homicide.  Id.  Out 
of the 272,111 persons released, approximately 4,300 were former child molesters.  Id. at 
“Child Victimizers.”  It was estimated that 3.3 percent of those 4,300 were rearrested within 
three years for another sex crime against a child.  Id.  The statistics went on to report that 60 
percent of those in prison for child molestation had molested a child thirteen years or 
younger.  Id.  See also Lampson, 143 CONG. REC. H7630 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement 
of Mr. Lampson) (stating that scientific studies have shown that sex offenders committing 
acts against children have one of the highest rates of recidivism); McCollum, 142 CONG. 
REC. H11132 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Mr. McCollum) (describing the 
recidivism rate of registered sex offenders at “10 times greater than other criminals[]”); 
Jackson-Lee, 142 CONG. REC. H11134 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Ms. Jackson-
Lee) (arguing that the scientific community has concluded that most child sex offenders 
cannot control themselves).  The previous statistics are used to illustrate recidivism rates 
and concerns stemming from a variety of sources.  
151 See infra Part III.A.2 (providing arguments for protecting the liberty interests of 
Internet sex offenders). 
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2. Arguments Against Implementing Computer and Internet, Post-
Release, Supervision Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders 
One popular argument against judicially imposed computer and 
Internet restrictions for sex offenders, and in particular, restrictions that 
totally ban computer and Internet use, is that these restrictions violate an 
individual’s First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom 
of association.152  While not directly citing to the Constitution, courts that 
have declined to uphold computer and Internet bans have reasoned that 
e-mail is a widely used form of communication.153  Indeed, the Internet 
functions as one of the most prevalent communication and information-
sharing mediums.154  Therefore, defendant-sex offenders argue that 
restrictions on computer and Internet use impermissibly infringes on a 
sex offender’s right to freedom of expression and prevents an offender 
from associating with others who access the Internet.155  However, two 
major government concerns undermine the force of these arguments. 
Two principal reasons for supervising Internet sex offenders after 
their release from prison are rehabilitation of the offender and public 
safety.156  In United States v. Bolinger, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
                                                 
152 See Wiest, supra note 45, at 863.  Weist suggests that Internet restrictions are 
permissible time, place, and manner restrictions.  Id. at 863 n.151.  See United States v. 
Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736–37 (7th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 
2001).  See also Habib, supra note 70, at 1079 (discussing cases that have based arguments on 
the constitutional grounds of computer and Internet restrictions). 
153 See White, 244 F.3d at 1206.  The court noted that the meaning of the post-release 
supervision restriction made it susceptible to remand.  Id.  However, the White court did 
not reach the question of whether the prohibition violated the First Amendment.  Id.  See 
also United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting computer and 
Internet restrictions as supervised release conditions). 
154 See Correll, supra note 45, at 682.  “The growth of Internet access has led to 
corresponding growth in Internet use:  tens of millions of Americans now use the Internet 
for everything from communicating through e-mail and instant messaging to shopping and 
conducting bank transactions.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
155 Habib, supra note 70, at 1080.  See Paul, 274 F.3d at 169.  In Paul, the court noted that 
Defendant Paul had used the Internet to seek out “fellow ‘boy lovers’ and provid[ed] them 
with advice on how to find and obtain access to ‘young friends.’”  Id. 
156 Habib, supra note 70, at 1080.  Contra Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex 
Offenders:  Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Increase Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, J. SEX 
OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT:  SCI. & L., 1, 141–49 (2006). 
 Sex offenders are universally hated and despised and seen as 
dangerous sexual predators unless locked up and kept under 
surveillance.  Following a number of highly publicized violent crimes, 
all states passed registration and notification laws and many passed 
civil commitment laws.  Although these laws were passed as a means 
to decrease recidivism and promote public safety, the resulting 
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Circuit rejected a defendant-sex offender’s freedom of association claim 
explaining that, “Probation conditions may seek to prevent reversion 
into a former crime-inducing lifestyle by barring contact with old haunts 
and associates, even though the activities may be legal.”157  Not only do 
Internet sex offenders go online to solicit victims, they also use the 
Internet as a place to trade and collect child pornography.158  Therefore, 
it is reasonable to conclude that restricting an Internet sex offender’s use 
of the Internet and his freedom to associate with other offenders will 
greatly increase the likelihood of achieving the twin aims of successfully 
rehabilitating the sex offender and ensuring the safety of the public.159 
The inability of Internet sex offenders to reintegrate into the 
community when courts severely limit their ability to participate in 
society is another growing concern.160  Take the defendant in Crandon, for 
example, who was prohibited from accessing any computer network and 
                                                                                                             
stigmatization of sex offenders is likely to result in disruption of their 
relationships, loss of or difficulties finding jobs, difficulties finding 
housing, and decreased psychological well-being, all factors that could 
increase their risk of recidivism. 
Id. 
157 United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991).  The defendant pled guilty 
to possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to prison and supervised release 
during which he could not be involved in any motorcycle club activities.  Id.  The court 
upheld this restriction because it reasonably restricted Bolinger from associating with 
persons most likely to cause him to relapse.  Id. at 480–81.  See also United States v. 
Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding a restriction prohibiting the 
defendant from associating with skinheads or Neo-Nazi or white supremacist 
organizations after being convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm because such 
associations might increase his likelihood of relapse). 
158 See Book, supra note 139, at 750.  See Mering de Villiers, Free Radicals in Cyberspace:  
Complex Liability Issues in Information Warfare, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 13, 105 (2005) 
(noting that the degree of anonymity on the Internet allows cybercriminals to commit 
crimes they otherwise would not have committed). 
159 See Habib, supra note 70, at 1080–81 (discussing the notion that if you take away bad 
influences, the only thing left is positive influences).  Helping offenders develop a new way 
of thinking can be beneficial in their treatment programs.  Id.  Contra Megan A. Janicki, 
Note, Better Seen Than Heard:  Residency Restrictions and Global Positioning System Tracking 
Laws for Sex Offenders, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 286 (2007).  Janicki argues that “no studies 
on these laws show that they actually reduce the number of sex offenses or the recidivism 
of previous sexual predators.”  Id. 
160 See supra note 47 (discussing the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the principal 
goals of supervised release programs).  See Wiest, supra note 45, at 866 (discussing the 
underlying purposes of section 3583 that are thwarted by computer and Internet 
restrictions).  See also Wakefield, supra note 156, at 147 (arguing that registries, notification, 
and housing restrictions make it much more difficult for sex offenders to succeed in society 
and may make them more likely to reoffend); Karen J. Hartman, Prison Walls and Firewalls:  
H.B. 2376 – Arizona Denies Inmates Access to the Internet, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1423, 1434–35 (2000) 
(discussing how Internet access helps prepare prison inmates for transition back into the 
community). 
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the Internet.161  The implications of such restrictions could be 
substantial.162  The restriction may hinder an individual’s ability to get a 
job that requires a computer and access to the Internet, impair an 
individual’s ability to search for jobs using one of the most resourceful 
job searching tools, and block an individual’s access to Internet sites that, 
if monitoring software was used instead, may have just as easily been 
blocked. 
Indeed, courts, in overturning computer and Internet bans, note the 
over-breadth and far-reaching implications of such restrictions as 
reasons for striking them down.163  Additionally, opponents of these 
restrictions argue that such restrictions prevent sex offenders from being 
able to possess digital or cellular phones with access to the Internet, use 
local ATMs, and shop with a credit card—all of which they claim are 
forms of Internet use.164  However, first, these arguments rely on a broad 
interpretation of Internet access, an interpretation that includes all 
devices capable of interacting via an Internet network (an interpretation 
which arguably need not be so broad).165  Second, even though Internet 
                                                 
161 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999); see supra notes 73–74 
(presenting the facts in Crandon). 
162 Id.  See generally Correll, supra note 45, at 703 (opposing the restriction of full Internet 
bans as post-release supervision restrictions for Internet sex offenders). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (remanding the case 
to the district court to impose a more narrowly tailored post-release supervision 
restriction); United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
condition forbidding Defendant Freeman from possessing any computer in his home or 
using any online computer service was overly broad); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 
1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (remanding to the district court because the condition could be 
interpreted too narrowly or could be interpreted as overly broad). 
164 See Wiest, supra note 45, at 862.  See ADAM WRIGHT, Mobile Phones Could Soon Rival the 
PC as World’s Dominant Internet Platform, IPSOS INSIGHT, (April 18, 2006), available at http:// 
www.ipsosna.com/news/client/act_dsp_pdf.cfm?name=mr060418-1b.pdf&id=3049 (last 
visited November 4, 2007).  In 2006, Ipsos Insight declared that, globally, 28 percent of 
mobile phone owners had browsed the Internet on a wireless handset.  Id.  Ipsos Insight also 
reported that Internet surfing on mobile phones is an emerging activity engaged in by a 
variety of demographics.  Id.  Due to their greater convenience and faster connection 
speeds, mobile phones are becoming the personal computer of the future.  Id. 
165 Wiest, supra note 45, at 862.  Opponents of computer and Internet restrictions as post-
release supervision restrictions for sex offenders argue that such restrictions on home 
computers limit the ability of the offender to obtain an online education from universities 
that conduct classes solely online.  Id.  If an offender is prohibited from accessing the 
Internet, then he would not be allowed to gain beneficial education.  Id. at 862.  In contrast, 
restrictions that allow the releasee to seek approval from a probation officer, which would 
then grant the offender access to such websites, have been upheld.  Id.  Other arguments 
specific to the daily use of the Internet include:  the restricting of the offender’s ability to 
shop both by credit card and online, communicate with others, and participate in 
recreational activities.  Id. at 863–65.  Americans now enjoy filing and paying taxes online, 
researching for jobs, reviewing current legislation, and much more.  Id.  The average 
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restrictions deny access to legitimate information and material that is 
otherwise legal to possess, courts are entitled to uphold these restrictions 
because of the nature of a sex offender’s inclination to use of the Internet 
to commit a sex crime.166  As society becomes more technology-
dependent, arguments against post-release supervision restrictions will 
likely gain force.167  However, currently, as long as a restriction is 
narrowly tailored to the purposes of sections 3553 and 3583 of Title 18 of 
the United States Code, a court will uphold it.168 
B. Have Federal Courts of Appeals Already Identified Important Factual 
Considerations to Consider When Determining Whether Computer and 
Internet Use, Post-Release, Supervision Restrictions Are Valid? 
In analyzing whether a computer or Internet use post-release 
supervision restriction is valid, sentencing courts follow the language in 
the United States Code.169  A district court may order any restriction that 
(1) is reasonably related to certain factors, including (a) 
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant, (b) deterring 
further criminal conduct by the defendant, or (c) 
protecting the public from further criminal conduct by 
the defendant; and (2) involves no greater deprivation of 
                                                                                                             
American with Internet access currently has more links to government information than at 
any point in the past.  Id.  As society becomes more dependent on technology and the 
Internet, restrictions prohibiting such access may have serious consequences in the future.  
Id. at 865.    
166 See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding the 
computer and Internet restriction even though the defendant argued that the restriction 
would limit his career opportunities); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125 (1999) (same).  See Habib, 
supra note 70, at 1086.  Courts uphold computer and Internet use, post-release, supervision 
restrictions for Internet sex offenders where the governmental interests—to protect the 
public and reintegrate the offender—outweigh the liberty interest of the defendant—to 
allow him to access the Internet.  Id. 
167 Habib, supra note 70, at 1091–92.  Recent surveys indicate that Internet usage among 
American consumers has reached an all-time high, with more than 70 percent of 
respondents reportedly using the Internet on a regular basis.  Mary Madden, PEW INTERNET 
& AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/ 
PIP_Internet_Impact.pdf. 
168 See supra note 143 (discussing which cases have upheld reasonably tailored computer 
and Internet use restrictions as post-release supervision restrictions for Internet sex 
offenders). 
169 See supra note 50 (discussing section 3583, of Title 18 of the United States Code).  See 
also Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127. 
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liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of 
deterrence and protection of the public.170 
It is important to note that courts continually approach post-release 
supervision restriction challenges by applying a case-by-case analysis as 
opposed to a per se ban against them.171  A case-by-case approach is 
significant for two reasons.  First, not all persons convicted of sexual 
crimes use computers or the Internet in the commission of their crimes.172  
Whether a sex offender used a computer or the Internet to commit a 
crime has been an important factor for courts, particularly those courts 
placing less emphasis on the extent of the Internet’s role in modern 
society.173  Second, a post-release supervision restriction must be 
reasonably related to the offense committed and serve the purposes 
previously stated in the above excerpt from the Crandon case:  to deter 
the sex offender from reoffending, and to protect the public.  For 
example, where a defendant was convicted of bank larceny, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that completely banning Internet use 
was not reasonably related to the defendant’s conviction and reversed 
the supervised release sentence, even though the defendant had 
previously been convicted for incest, and police officials had found legal 
adult pornography on his computer prior to his bank larceny sentencing 
hearing.174  Courts supporting this position suggest that there is no need 
                                                 
170 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d) (2006) (stating the official 
language cited by the Crandon court). 
171 See United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 386 (3d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that in 
Crandon, Crandon’s previous actions of using the Internet to contact minor children, which 
led to his conviction for a sexual offense, warranted a conditional restriction on his 
computer and Internet access, whereas in Freeman, there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that Freeman used the Internet to contact minors).  Each case is unique in its fact 
patterns, and each sex offender deserves the opportunity to state his position.  Taking an 
individualized approach allows the courts to assess an offender’s prior record, 
employment history, psychological evaluations, and any other relevant character evidence 
introduced. 
172 See supra notes 91 & 94 (setting out the cases in which computer and Internet use 
restrictions have been both upheld and denied when the use of the Internet was not an 
element of the crime).  See also United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001), where 
Defendant Peterson was convicted of bank larceny, and United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 
734 (7th Cir. 2003), where Defendant Todd Scott was convicted of fraud and police 
discovered images of child pornography on his work computer. 
173 See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the White 
court’s proposition that an absolute ban on Internet use is an unacceptable condition of 
supervised release only because it might keep someone from checking the weather or 
reading a newspaper online). 
174 Peterson, 248 F.3d at 82.  In 1999, Larry Peterson (“Peterson”) pled guilty to bank 
larceny for writing fraudulent checks.  Id. at 81.  In 2000, during Peterson’s sentencing, the 
district court imposed special conditions of probation that were influenced by Peterson’s 
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to cut off access to a person’s e-mail or Internet use when a more focused 
restriction, such as random inspections of the defendant’s computer, is 
available.175  It appears that courts are unwilling to uphold computer and 
Internet restrictions when neither a computer nor the Internet is used in 
the commission of the crime.176 
An underlying distinction between judicial opinions in the Tenth 
Circuit is whether a post-release supervision restriction allows the sex 
offender to regain access to the Internet at some point in the future.177  In 
Walser, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit distinguished 
Defendant Walser’s probation restrictions from the probation restrictions 
it had previously considered in White.178  In both cases the courts 
considered whether the restrictions permitted the released offender to 
access the Internet under certain conditions.179  The Walser court upheld 
the defendant-sex offender’s probation restrictions because they allowed 
Walser to gain access to the Internet with permission from his probation 
officer.180  In contrast, in White, White’s supervised release restrictions 
                                                                                                             
1996 conviction for incest and the legal adult pornography found on his computer both 
before and after sentencing.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not see 
how the broad restrictions on Peterson’s ownership of a computer or access to the Internet 
were “‘reasonably related[]’ to ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense’ or Peterson’s 
‘history and characteristics.’”  Id. at 82 (citation omitted).  
175 Scott, 316 F.3d at 737.  For example, in Scott, Defendant Todd Scott (“Scott”) was 
convicted of fraud.  Id. at 734.  During the investigation, child pornography was recovered 
from his computer.  Id. at 734–35.  The district court imposed, as a condition of his release, a 
complete ban on his use of computer and Internet use unless he obtained prior approval 
from his probation officer to use a computer or the Internet.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded to the lower court to impose a 
more narrow restriction.  Id. at 737.  The court noted that Scott did not have a record of 
extensive abuse of network communications that would justify a complete ban of his 
Internet access.  Id.  The court suggested that unannounced inspections of the defendant’s 
home computer and hard drives or removable disks might be a more appropriate sentence, 
and accordingly, remanded the case for appropriate resentencing.  Id. 
176 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing cases in which circuit courts have reversed bans on 
computer and Internet use restrictions). 
177 See supra Part II.C (discussing how circuits disagree over the imposition of computer 
and Internet restrictions for Internet sex offenders). 
178 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the sentence 
imposed by the court balanced the goals of protecting the public with the goals of 
sentencing:  preventing recidivism and reintegrating the sex offender into the community).  
See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001) (striking down the post-
release supervision restriction on the computer and Internet use of a sex offender, 
reasoning that it represents a greater deprivation of his personal liberty interests than 
necessary). 
179 See supra note 178 (discussing the holdings in Walser and White).  See also supra Part 
II.C.1 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s decisions relating to the post-release supervision 
restrictions on computer and Internet use for sex offenders that allow the sex offender to 
use the computer or Internet by obtaining permission from a probation or parole officer). 
180 Walser, 275 F.3d at 988. 
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did not allow White to seek permission for Internet use under any 
circumstances; therefore, the court found his restrictions to be 
“potentially too narrow and overly broad.”181  The court gave examples 
of how it was possible to be both too narrow and overly broad.182 
Indeed, other courts have also upheld computer and Internet use 
restrictions as conditions of supervised release when the restrictions 
contained a provision allowing a probation officer to grant the released 
offender permission to access the Internet.183  Specifically, the Courts of 
Appeals for the Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits 
have upheld such restrictions for released Internet sex offenders.184  
When considering the conditions of supervised release of an Internet sex 
offender, a balance must be struck between the released sex offender’s 
liberty interests, rehabilitation and reintegration goals, and the state’s 
interest in protecting society from repeat Internet sex offenders.185  States 
such as New Jersey acknowledge this balance.186 
                                                 
181 White, 244 F.3d at 1206.  The court ruled that any restriction on the computer or 
Internet use of a sex offender must allow some sort of monitoring by a probation officer in 
order to be upheld.  Id. at 1207.  See also Correll, supra note 45, at 694.  Correll compares the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sofsky to the reasoning set forth 
by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in White, explaining that neither court sees a 
simple way to prevent access to either the Internet or telephones.  Id. 
182 White, 244 F.3d at 1206.  First, the restriction was too narrow because the way it was 
written, White could have easily used any computer with Internet access at a public library 
or cybercafé and still would have been in technical compliance with the restriction.  Id.  
Alternatively, if White had not been allowed to use any computer device at all, the 
restriction would have been too broad.  Id. at 1207. 
183 See, e.g., United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a ban on 
computer and Internet use as a post-release supervision restriction is valid as long as it 
contains a provision that allows a probation officer to grant the released offender 
permission to access a computer or the Internet); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608 
(9th Cir. 2003) (same); Walser, 275 F.3d 981(same); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 
(3d Cir. 1999) (same). 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding the 
district court’s imposition of computer and Internet restrictions for a released sex offender); 
Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1026 
(8th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
computer and Internet use restrictions that allow a probation officer to grant the released 
offender permission to access a computer or the Internet); Walser, 275 F.3d at 985 (same); 
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127–28 (same).   
185 Wiest, supra note 45, at 871.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583 (d)(2); 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006)   This 
balance is important to prevent “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 
necessary” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant[.]”  Id.  See also 
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127 (discussing the importance of balancing of section 3583 and section 
3553 factors). 
186 See infra Part III.C (discussing the effectiveness of the New Jersey statute addressing 
computer and Internet restrictions as post-release supervision restrictions for Internet sex 
offenders). 
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C. Has New Jersey Found the Answer? 
In 2007, New Jersey enacted a statute that imposes post-release 
supervision Internet access conditions on a person convicted of 
committing a sex offense via the Internet.187  These conditions include 
prohibiting the person from “accessing or using a computer or any other 
device with Internet capability without the prior written approval of the 
court[.]”188  This language adequately reflects judicial opinions that have 
upheld Internet conditions.  For example, the court explained in United 
States v. Rearden that a “condition does not plainly involve a greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purpose 
because it is not absolute; rather, it allows for approval of appropriate 
online access by the Probation Office.”189 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has yet to hear a case 
challenging the constitutionality of New Jersey’s statute restricting the 
computer and Internet use of Internet sex offenders.  However, despite 
disallowing the computer and Internet use restrictions in Freeman, the 
court upheld similar restrictions in Crandon.190  In addition, although the 
Freeman court remanded the case for resentencing, it did not hold that 
computer and Internet restrictions, generally, are unconstitutional, but 
rather that the restrictions imposed on Defendant Freeman were a 
greater deprivation than reasonably necessary because there was no 
evidence in the record to suggest that Defendant Freeman had used the 
Internet to contact children or that he had built his child pornography 
collection through online activities.191  A factor that the Crandon court 
considered was that Crandon had used the Internet to contact young 
                                                 
187 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008).   
188 Id. § 2C:45-1(d)(2)(a). 
189 Rearden, 349 F.3d at 621.  In July of 2000, Chance Rearden (“Rearden”) answered an 
online posting from David Settlemyer (“Settlemeyer”), who posted a comment asking if 
anyone was interested in “raping and ravaging” his three nieces.  Id. at 611.  Reardon and 
Settlemyer engaged in several subsequent discussions, and in August of 2000 Settlemyer 
was arrested.  Id. at 612.  However, Rearden was unaware of the arrest and continued his 
communications with Settlemyer, who had subsequently agreed to work with federal 
authorities.  Id.  In December of the same year, Rearden e-mailed who he thought to be 
Settlemyer a list of websites with child pornography as well as some pictures of children 
performing sexual acts.  Id.  In February 2001, Rearden was arrested.  Id.  Rearden was 
convicted of shipping child pornography and sentenced to fifty-one months imprisonment 
followed by a period of supervised release with special conditions imposed.  Id. at 612. 
190 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128 (upholding the computer and Internet restrictions imposed 
on Defendant Crandon); United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the restrictions on computer possession and Internet access were too broad to 
be enforceable). See supra note 97 (discussing factual differences between Crandon and 
Freeman). 
191 Freeman, 316 F.3d at 391–92. 
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children, whereas the defendant in Freeman merely used the Internet but 
made no direct (illegal) contacts with it.192  Therefore, if the proper set of 
facts is presented, like the facts in Crandon, one may reasonably assume 
that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit will uphold the New 
Jersey restrictions on computer and Internet use.  Because New Jersey’s 
statute makes using the computer or any other device with Internet 
capability an element of the sex crime for which the sex offender was 
convicted that must be proved before deciding whether to restrict 
computer or Internet use, the statute has a built-in safeguard to protect 
against overbroad application of these restrictions to all criminals—even 
those who did not use a computer or the Internet in committing their 
crime.  
Some state statutes addressing computer and Internet use 
restrictions for Internet sex offenders on supervised release are not as 
thorough as New Jersey’s statute, while others are comparably 
thorough.193  What appears consistently among state statutes is a 
provision allowing for some type of review process through which the 
sex offender may request and receive permission to access the Internet.194  
                                                 
192 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125. 
193 See supra note 4 (listing state statutes that reflect computer and Internet restrictions).  
Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1)(q) (2006) (stating that the defendant shall not 
“possess any electronic device capable of accessing the Internet and not access the Internet 
through any such device or any other means[] . . .”), and FLA. STAT. §§ 948.30(1)(g)–(h), 
947.1405(7)(a)(7) (2007) (prohibiting the “viewing, accessing, owning or possessing any 
obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including 
telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to 
the offender’s deviant behavior pattern[]”), with MINN. STAT. § 243.055 (2003) (providing a 
more detailed approach to computer and Internet restrictions, such as if use is allowed, 
requiring the sex offender to agree to time logs, monitoring software, unannounced 
searches of the computer, and limitations on the types of software purchased), and N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (same). 
194 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 948.30(1)(g)–(h), 947.1405(7)(a)(7) (2007) (restricting computer 
programs and computer services “[u]nless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan 
provided by the sexual offender treatment program[]”); MINN. STAT. § 243.055(2)(5) (2003) 
(stating that the commissioner may “prohibit the individual from possessing or using any 
computer, except that the individual may, with the prior approval of the individual’s 
parole or probation agent, use a computer in connection with authorized employment[]”); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1)(q) (2006) (stating that the defendant cannot access the 
Internet with any device “unless possession of such a device or such access is approved by 
the parole and probation officer assigned to the defendant[]”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-
1(d)(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (providing that the sex offender can only access a computer or 
Internet for the person’s employment or in search of employment “with the prior approval 
of the person’s probation officer[]”).  Some review processes include requiring the sex 
offender to seek permission from a parole or probation officer before accessing the Internet, 
fulfill the requirements of a sex offender treatment program, and participate in a risk 
assessment test.  See supra note 4 (listing state statutes that reflect computer and Internet 
restrictions).  
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Such a provision creates a fair balance between protecting the public 
from repeat offenders and not unnecessarily infringing on the liberty 
interests of a released Internet sex offender.  States such as New Jersey 
have enacted legislation that allows a court to impose strict computer 
and Internet use restrictions on high-risk Internet sex offenders, but also 
provides an opportunity for low-risk offenders to maintain access to 
computers and the Internet.  Protecting the public is of utmost 
importance, and over the past several years this has been the primary 
underlying goal of sex offender statutes. 
D. What Are the Driving Policy Considerations Behind Computer and 
Internet Use Restrictions? 
Decreasing the rate of recidivism of Internet sex offenders and 
eradicating child pornography are two major government interests in 
imposing computer and Internet restrictions on Internet sex offenders.195  
However, the dangers posed by Internet sex offenders cannot easily be 
contained by regular in-person supervision.196  Police officers arrest 
approximately eighteen thousand sex offenders in the United States each 
year.197  More than half of all convicted sex offenders are placed on 
probation and assigned to officers operating under heavy case loads.198  
Given this ratio, the most convenient form of monitoring would be for 
the offender not to possess a computer at all, but this is seldom the 
                                                 
195 United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2004).  See United States 
Department of Justice, supra note 149, at 5.  Child pornography defendants represented 65 
percent of all sex exploitation criminals in 2006.  Id.  Sixty-six percent of sex abuse 
defendants received an enhanced sentence because the victim was under the age of sixteen.  
Id. at 6.  Of child pornography defendants sentenced, two out of three were sentenced for 
having more than ten illegal items, such as books, magazines, or films.  Id.  “Ninety-five 
percent [of child pornography defendants] were sentenced for materials depicting a minor 
under age 12, and 97[] [percent] were sentenced for the use of a computer in the offense.”  
Id. 
196 JIM TANNER, RETHINKING COMPUTER MANAGEMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS UNDER 
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 15 JUVENILE OFFENDER MONITORING NO. 11, at 1 (2007), 
http://www.kbsolutions.com/rcm.pdf (last visited November 4, 2007).  See UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, Probation and Parole in the 
United States, 2006, 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus06.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2008).  “The number of adult men and women in the United States who were 
being supervised on probation or parole at the end of 2006 reached 5,035,225[.]”  Id. 
197 TANNER, supra note 196, at 1.  Tanner also mentions that various Internet “search 
engines estimate 60 million pages of sexually related content currently exist on the 
Internet.”  Id. 
198 Id.  In addition to officer in-person observation, monitoring and filtering software 
have been considered as other possible supervision tools.  BOWKER & THOMPSON, supra 
note 56, at 19.  The results of such software can then be used as a basis for conducting a 
subsequent more intrusive computer search.  Id. 
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case.199  Therefore, it is the probation officer’s responsibility to monitor 
the activities of Internet sex offenders once they are released back into 
society.200  If restrictions become too narrow, for example, requiring 
weekly inspections of all Internet sex offenders’ computers, it could 
become difficult for probation officers to keep pace and effectively 
monitor compliance with the restrictions.201 
In United States v. Scott, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
noted that if Internet sex offenders argue that Internet use, post-release, 
restrictions are unfair, then a court could instead increase prison 
sentences at its discretion to decrease the likelihood that offenders will 
have the opportunity to reoffend.202  Although the defendant, Todd 
Scott, was not convicted of an Internet sex crime, but rather of fraud, the 
court explained that “[i]f full access [to the Internet] posed an 
unacceptable risk of recidivism, yet all controls on access were 
forbidden, then a judge would have little alternative but to increase the 
term of imprisonment in order to incapacitate the offender.”203 
Restricting an Internet sex offender’s right to computer and Internet 
use is a justified response, considering both the severity of the crime and 
the government’s interest in protecting the public.204  In addition, 
allowing probation officers to monitor Internet sex offenders’ use of the 
Internet provides a proactive solution to helping offenders rehabilitate 
and reintegrate into society.205  Computer and Internet use restrictions 
                                                 
199 BOWKER & THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 19. 
200 Id. at 18.  There are three reasons why a broad Internet restriction should not be 
allowed.  Id. at 19.  First, the term “computer” is difficult to define in today’s 
technologically advanced society.  Id.  Second, as computers become more integral to 
society, so does the average person’s dependence on them.  Id.  Third, when the probation 
officer is given the discretion to grant or deny Internet access, this authority has the 
potential to create discrepancies between the approaches adopted by different police 
officers to granting access for each offender, thus, defeating the court’s position that the 
condition is narrowly tailored.  Id. 
201 This is not to say that it would be impossible or that, in all cases, random checks 
would need to be monthly instead of weekly, but currently probation officers operate 
under heavy caseloads.  Implementing more involved or more frequent observation 
requirements would negatively affect the efficiency of their work.  On the other hand, if 
computer checks were limited to once a month, sex offenders who are highly skilled in 
working with computers may be able to hide more inappropriate material, correspondence, 
or images in undetectable locations than if a stricter monitoring sentence was implicated. 
202 United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2003).  Scott was convicted of 
fraud and the court held that because Scott did not have a record of extensive abuse of 
digital communications, an outright ban could not be justified.  Id. at 737. 
203 Id. at 736–37.  However, it is unlikely that offenders would see this as a beneficial 
exchange and would likely prefer to take the conditional freedom of supervised release 
restrictions.  Id. at 737. 
204 See supra note 47 (citing the government’s interest in sentencing conditions). 
205 See Correll, supra note 45, at 686–88. 
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should be warranted in circumstances where they are narrowly tailored 
to apply to sex offenders who used computers and the Internet to 
commit Internet sex crimes, and where the restrictions provide for 
proper public protection, while minimizing the liberty deprivations of 
the released offenders. 
IV.  A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Because many states lack statutory language regarding Internet sex 
offenders and, more specifically, special computer and Internet 
restrictions for Internet sex offenders, this Note proposes a model statute 
for states to consider in addressing this issue.206  Set forth below is a 
model statute incorporating provisions set out in the New Jersey and 
Minnesota statutes for computer and Internet use, post-release, 
supervision restrictions.207  
A. To Whom Does the Proposed Model Statute Apply? 
Proposed below is a model statute for states to address computer 
and Internet use post-release supervision restrictions for Internet sex 
offenders.  This first section details to whom the restrictions may apply: 
1.  In addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to 
subsection b. or c., the court may order [In the case of] a 
person who has been convicted[,] or adjudicated 
delinquent[, or found guilty by reason of insanity for the 
commission] of a sex offense as defined in subsection b. of 
section 2 of P.L.1994, c.133 (C.2C:7-2), [in the applicable 
statutory law,] and who is required to register as 
provided in subsections c. and d. of section 2 of P.L.1994, 
c. 133 (C.2C:7-2),or who has been convicted or 
adjudicated delinquent for a violation of N.J.S.2C:34-3 to 
be subject to any of the following Internet access 
conditions: [a sex offender, or who is serving a special 
sentence of community or parole supervision for life, and 
where the trier of fact makes a finding that a computer and 
any other device with Internet capability was used to facilitate 
the commission of the crime, the court shall, in addition to any 
                                                 
206  See infra Parts IV.A–E (providing model statutory language and the reasoning behind 
each section of the model statute). 
207  See infra Parts IV.A–E (providing model statutory language, primarily based on New 
Jersey’s and Minnesota’s statutes). 
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other disposition, order the following Internet access 
restrictions:]208 
Commentary 
The purpose of this first part of the model statute is to establish to 
whom the computer and Internet restrictions apply.209  Because New 
Jersey’s statute effectively establishes to whom the statute applies, the 
proposed model statute is based largely on the language of New Jersey’s 
statute.  This model statute, however, does not define what a sex offense 
is or which sex offenses should be covered by the terms of the statute; 
these definitions should be left to the discretion of the state legislative 
body.210 
B. What Does the Proposed Model Statute Restrict? 
This section of the model statute, which would follow immediately 
after the prior section set forth above, provides for a complete ban on 
computer and Internet use, unless the offender obtains prior approval 
from a probation officer to override the ban: 
(A)  Prohibit the person from accessing or using a 
computer and/or any other device with Internet capability 
without prior written approval from either the court or 
probation or parole officer or any other device with Internet 
capability without the prior written approval of the 
court, except the person may use a computer or any 
other device with Internet capability in connection with 
that person’s employment or search for employment 
                                                 
208 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008).  The normal font in the cited 
statute represents the language of the original statute.  See id.  The text that appears in 
italics is the proposed language from this Note’s author.  See also supra note 62 (describing 
New Jersey’s Internet sex offender statute restricting Internet use for Internet sex offenders 
on supervised release). 
209 The broad applicability of the statute is intended to encompass a vast spectrum of 
Internet sex offenders, ranging from child victimizers to rapists who found their victims 
through on-line services.  
210 Setting forth model guidelines for Congress to implement is beyond the scope of this 
Note.  See, e.g., supra notes 38–39 (giving an example of SORNA’s guidelines, and noting 
that states have discretion in labeling sex offenders, in applying SORNA’s Tier-I to a Tier-
III approach). 
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with the prior approval of the person’s probation 
officer[].211 
Commentary 
This model language provides that an offender may be denied access 
to a computer and any other device with Internet capability.  By creating 
an “and/or” option, the court has the discretion to decide whether an 
offender should be prohibited only from accessing the Internet or 
whether he should be completely banned from computers.  In addition, 
unlike New Jersey’s statute, the proposed language gives the court and 
the probation or parole officer the opportunity to override the restriction 
by granting approval.  New Jersey’s statute allowed the court to grant 
permission at any time, but gave only the probation or parole office such 
discretion for employment issues.212  This model statute, by contrast, 
allows for either the court or probation or parole officer to grant 
permission to the released offender to access a computer or the Internet. 
C. How Does the Proposed Model Statute Apply to the Work Environment? 
The next section of the proposed statute addresses the exception of 
work-related computer and Internet access: 
(B)  Prohibit the person from accessing or using a 
computer and/or any other device with Internet capability 
without the prior written approval of the court, except 
the person may use a computer or any other device with 
Internet capability in connection with that person’s 
employment or search for employment without prior 
written approval from either the court or probation or parole 
officer.213 
                                                 
211 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008).  The normal font in the cited 
statute represents the language of the original statute, and the parts stuck through are the 
work of the author.  See id.  The text that appears in italics is the proposed language from 
this Note’s author.  See also supra note 62 (describing New Jersey’s Internet sex offender 
statute that restricts Internet use for Internet sex offenders on supervised release). 
212  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (allowing a sex offender 
computer and Internet access for work-related purposes if the access is approved by the 
offender’s probation officer).  The author of this Note has placed employment exceptions in 
a separate section of the proposed statute.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing when an offender 
may be granted permission to use the computer and Internet for employment related 
purposes). 
213 See infra note 212 (describing an exception in New Jersey’s statute for employment 
related purposes). 
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Commentary 
This statutory language addresses the applicability of the restriction 
to the released offender’s working environment and the ability to seek 
employment.  Here, New Jersey’s statutory section has been split into 
two parts, a bifurcation which allows courts to address the personal and 
professional aspects of the sex offender’s life separately.  Reintegration 
into the community is a top priority of the supervised release program, 
and the sex offender’s ability to obtain and maintain a job will play a 
significant role in achieving that priority.214 
D. Safeguards for Alternative Monitoring 
The next provision of the model statute provides safeguards for 
courts to implement when discretionary approval is granted by courts or 
probationary or parole officers: 
(C)  If the person is granted computer and/or Internet access, 
require the individual to maintain a daily log of all 
addresses the individual accesses through any computer 
other than for authorized employment and to make this 
log available to the individual’s parole or probation 
agent[.]215 
Commentary 
If the court chooses to give the released offender access to a 
computer, this additional precaution requires that the offender record his 
daily Internet activity.  Although the person may not record all the sites 
visited, if the daily log is used in conjunction with a monitoring system, 
then this would serve as a check on the person’s honesty with respect to 
reporting Internet activity.216  Because few state statutes actually require 
released offenders to submit to periodic unannounced examinations and 
monitoring by software devices, these self-reporting requirements help 
ease the burden on those probation officers in charge of monitoring large 
caseloads of Internet sex offenders.217 
                                                 
214 See Correll, supra note 45, at 686–88 (defining the goals of rehabilitation and 
reintegration). 
215 See MINN. STAT. §243.055(2)(2) (2003).  The proposed amendments are italicized and 
are the contribution of this Note’s author. 
216 Different monitoring and filtering software are available for law enforcement agencies 
across the United States. 
217 See generally BOWKER & THOMPSON, supra note 56 (discussing the effects of computer 
crime on probation officers). 
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E. Leaving Room for Technological Advancement 
The last section of the proposed model statute addresses 
technological advancements and prevents crafty criminals from 
identifying and capitalizing on loopholes in the statutory text.  
Computer crimes are something relatively new to the criminal world, 
and enacting a broad regulatory restriction serves two purposes:  (1) 
position the statute to be able to nimbly respond to technological 
advancements and thus prevent it from becoming moot, and (2) prevent 
offenders from being able to identify and take advantage of loopholes in 
the supervised release process. 
(D)  Require the person to submit to any other 
appropriate restrictions concerning the person’s use or 
access of a computer or any other device with Internet 
capability.218 
Commentary 
The final section of the model statute is significant and is taken 
directly from the New Jersey statutory scheme.  This last section is 
important for the same reason that a statute is needed to address 
computer and Internet restrictions for Internet sex offenders—
technology is forever advancing and changing our way of life, as well as 
the criminal’s way of operating.  By allowing the court broad discretion 
to impose appropriate restrictions, the statute will be able to keep pace 
with new technology and new forms of crime.  By implementing this 
statutory language, states will help advance the criminal justice system 
into twenty-first century technology. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Bigboy44 will be sentenced in a jurisdiction that has implemented the 
model statute proposed in Part IV of this Note.  What will the court 
decide?  First, Bigboy44 was convicted of a sex crime and will now have 
to register in the community as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA.  
Second, Bigboy44 used the computer and Internet to facilitate his crime.  
Therefore, under the language of the proposed model statute, Bigboy44 
will likely be a prime candidate for computer and Internet use 
restrictions during his post-release supervision.  Although the judge may 
                                                 
218 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(d)(2)(d) (West Supp. 2008).  See supra note 62 (describing 
New Jersey’s recently passed Internet sex offender statute, conditioning Internet 
restrictions). 
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impose such restrictions on Bigboy44, according to the model statute, the 
judge must provide Bigboy44 with the opportunity to obtain access to a 
computer or the Internet by seeking permission from either the court or 
probation or parole officer. 
The children of today are on computers and the Internet more than 
ever.  Cyberspace is the playground of the twenty-first century.  The 
Internet is a superhighway into our homes and communities.  By 
restricting the access of Internet sex offenders to this superhighway, 
courts will not only protect the public from dangerous Internet 
predators, but they will also help offenders reintegrate back into society 
by taking away any criminal temptations.  Accordingly, the model 
statute proposed in this Note provides a guide for states to consider 
when drafting legislation to address computer and Internet restrictions 
for Internet sex offenders. 
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